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4.1  Introduction 
A wave of financial innovation begun in the early 1960s is now sweep- 
ing throughout the United States and other developed economies, pro- 
ducing major changes in the financial landscape. While the details of 
the process differ country by country, there are several common fea- 
tures, including (i) innovation-the  development of new financial prod- 
ucts and markets; (ii) securitization-a  greater tendency toward mar- 
ket-determined interest rates and marketable financial instruments rather 
than bank loans; (iii) liberalization-of domestic financial market prac- 
tices either through explicit deregulation or a breaking down of con- 
ventions; (iv) globalization-as  national barriers  erode and financial 
markets grow more integrated; and (v) increased competition among 
financial institutions, with many of the traditional distinctions between 
commercial banks, investment banks, and securities firms becoming 
blurred in the process. 
A major feature of this process has been the introduction of a wide 
variety  of  new products  that trade in new market  settings, thereby 
reducing the reliance upon banks for traditional credit instruments and 
credit evaluations. Many of these new products (e.g., currency and 
interest rate swaps, currency and interest rate options) are of obvious 
assistance for risk management purposes-to  enable the individual or 
firm to tailor the various dimensions of risk (e.g., currency, maturity, 
credit, interest rate, default, and so forth) more precisely than before. 
Other products (e.g., note issuance facilities and Eurocurrency com- 
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mercial paper) appear to directly reduce the cost of funding a desired 
financial position. The basic principles underlying today’s new financial 
products are being extended and reapplied to yield still more products.* 
It is not an exaggeration to claim that these developments are having 
a profound impact on all aspects of the financial services industry. For 
individual employees, innovation  has affected the job description of 
the typical bank  “lending”  officer at major money center banks, the 
human capital needed to perform well, and even the definition of normal 
business hours. At the level of  the financial services firm, innovation 
has affected the geographic location of activities, the financial product 
line, the risks that are being traded or carried, the identity of the major 
players, and the intensity of competition. Nonfinancial firms are faced 
with a vast array of financial choices-new  financial markets and prod- 
ucts, each with their own risk and return properties-that  require in- 
creasingly sophisticated analysis. Naturally, all of  these factors feed 
into macroeconomic performance. Policymakers and regulatory agen- 
cies are keen to understand the potential benefits (or costs) of these 
new products,  new procedures,  and new players and to incorporate 
these new factors into macroeconomic policies and regulatory decisions. 
This paper provides a broad assessment of these recent developments 
surrounding financial innovation, including their impact on financial 
stability and national policy-making. This theme suggests several basic 
questions: (i) What financial product  and process changes  have oc- 
curred over the last twenty to twenty-five years in U.S. and interna- 
tional financial markets? (ii) What factors account for these changes? 
(iii) What are the implications of these changes for individuals and the 
aggregate macroeconomy from both a positive and policy perspective? 
This paper lays a foundation that will address these questions. 
Section 4.2 outlines the dimensions of the international financial mar- 
ketplace. Data presented on the volume of activity in the Eurocurrency 
and Eurobond markets offer a good reflection of the general phenom- 
enon in financial markets-mushrooming  volume, transforming  mar- 
kets once thought to be ancillary or for a specialized few into major 
centers of activity. Data on the extent of  securitization and on trading 
in new risk management and funding vehicles (e.g., futures, options, 
and swaps) are also presented. Again the picture is one of  securities 
or markets that were virtually nonexistent a decade ago, but now have 
grown to substantial importance. 
Section 4.3 presents an overview of the types of new financial prod- 
ucts that  are available and their functions.  Several financial market 
innovations are described to illustrate their workings and recent evo- 
lution and to demonstrate how the products add value for market par- 
ticipants. These examples also illustrate how new financial products 
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the new instruments need not add new price risk to the system, but 
by adding liquidity and new intermediaries they may contribute addi- 
tional credit or liquidity risks. 
The causes of  financial market innovation  are explored in section 
4.4. I first consider the demand for financial market services in a “per- 
fect capital market”  setting and then argue that financial market in- 
novations may be viewed as attempts to overcome real-world market 
imperfections.  A distinction is made between imperfections that are 
man-made (e.g., taxes, regulatory barriers, and information disclosure) 
versus those that segment domestic markets and are naturally present 
(e.g.,  transaction  costs, heterogeneous  expectations, and heteroge- 
neous  consumption/investment/risk  preferences).  Innovations  that 
overcome the former may directly thwart national economic policies, 
including useful prudential policies, while innovations that overcome 
the latter tend to increase economic (allocational) efficiency. 
The implications of financial market innovation are discussed on two 
levels. First, in section 4.5,  I examine the consequences of innovation 
on  financial market prices,  international price  relationships,  and  fi- 
nancing opportunities. Then in section 4.6 I analyze the consequences 
of innovation for macroprudential policy and broader macroeconomic 
policy. 
On the markets side, innovations act to reduce the impact of market 
imperfections, whether man-made or natural. As a result, we expect 
to observe greater  capital mobility, greater  similarity in  the cost of 
funds in alternative capital markets, greater integration of international 
capital markets, and greater substitutability  among assets as a result 
of improved hedging opportunities. 
On the policy side, there are two major concerns. One is whether 
recent innovations have the capacity to impose negative externalities 
on society. As stated above, innovations act to reduce the impact of 
market  imperfections,  including those  macroprudential  policies  de- 
signed to improve welfare by safeguarding the financial system. One 
specific concern is that the innovative process has led to a kind of 
“regulatory arbitrage,”  with financial institutions attempting to lower 
their costs and expand their activities by seeking out the least regulated 
environment. These shifts in activity have raised fears that innovation 
may increase the risk burden on financial institutions and adversely 
affect the safety and soundness of the financial system. These fears 
are compounded  by the prospect of  nations competing for financial 
services activity by further reductions in the regulatory burden. 
Securitization poses another specific example of potential welfare 
losses associated with financial innovation. Securitization and the in- 
creased use of financial intermediaries place the burden of credit eval- 
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may itself be seen as a source of added risk. To  some extent, this may 
be because the new instruments lack transparency (i.e., they are not 
well understood), and they  have  not  stood the test of two or three 
business cycles. Increased reliance on the market system (i.e., ade- 
quate information  disclosure of  off-balance-sheet  items,  marking to 
market of  financial positions, and so forth) may provide an adequate 
remedy for some of these fears. 
The second major policy concern is the impact of financial innovation 
on macroeconomic policies in general and monetary policy in partic- 
ular. At one level, these concerns are operational. The availability of 
variable-rate financing and hedging techniques makes the timing and 
incidence of monetary policy more uncertain. And related to this, the 
increasing ease of substitutability between assets and new techniques 
of obtaining credit may reduce the meaning and usefulness of traditional 
monetary and credit aggregates as indicators of monetary policy. 
A more fundamental concern is that greater international mobility 
of  capital and tighter integration of  financial markets has altered the 
channels through which monetary policy works, ultimately threatening 
the welfare gains associated with international trade. Innovation ap- 
pears to have reduced (to various degrees in different countries) the 
ability of  authorities to adopt direct quantitative controls over credit 
or interest rate ceilings. With the effectiveness of the credit and controls 
channels reduced, it appears that monetary policy now has a greater 
impact on exchange rates, directly affecting the real competitiveness 
of domestic manufacturing. A country following a comparatively tight 
domestic monetary policy is therefore likely to lose international com- 
petitiveness, possibly setting off demands for trade protection. To  the 
extent that countries seek to reduce the variability of  exchange rate 
movements, the new financial environment limits the scope for effective 
and independent domestic monetary policies. 
Viewed in isolation, the recent wave of financial innovations holds 
the potential to produce an international allocation of  capital that is 
more consistent with economic risk-return considerations and alloca- 
tional efficiency. An erosion of the gains from trade in manufactures 
and commodities would represent significant potential welfare losses. 
The major policy question, then, is whether free trade is antithetical 
to capital liberalization. Dealing with this added dimension of  policy 
coordination will be the challenge for policy makers in the years to 
come. 
4.2  Dimensions of International Financial Markets 
The international financial marketplace has undergone a tremendous 
expansion in  terms of the variety of products, the volume of trading, 
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this section suggest that a variety of financial markets, which were in 
their infancy or nonexistent two decades ago, have grown to become 
major centers of activity and influence. The growth of these markets 
demonstrates their significance and potential implications for investors, 
corporate managers, and national policymakers. We begin by reviewing 
the growth of three traditional international financial markets-the  for- 
eign exchange market, the Eurocurrency  market, and the Eurobond 
market. Then data on the rise of securitization are presented, followed 
by measures of activity in the markets for futures, options, and swaps. 
4.2.1 
The foreign exchange market, the interbank market for the exchange 
of  bank deposits denominated in different currencies, has existed in 
one form or another for centuries and could hardly be called a modern 
innovation. In recent  times, the foreign exchange market  has  been 
organized as a dispersed, broker-dealer market with high-speed tele- 
communications  systems linking together the various participants in 
this worldwide, twenty-four-hour market. The volume and efficiency 
of  the market is such that the spread between bid and offer prices in 
the spot market is often one-tenth of one percent, or less, for the major 
currencies. 
The data in  table  4.1 suggest the  tremendous  volume of  activity 
handled in the foreign exchange market and its recent growth. Surveys 
carried out within the last year indicate that London is the most active 
Foreign Exchange and the Euromarkets 
Table 4.1  Average Daily Foreign Exchange Trading Volume 
by Location and Currency 
New York 
Tokyo  London  New York  (1977) 
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Sources: Press releases of the Bank of Tokyo, Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve 
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foreign exchange trading location, with transactions totaling $90 billion 
per day. New York is the second most active center trading with $50 
billion per day, and Tokyo is close behind with $48 billion per day. The 
total for these three centers is $188 billion per day. Adding the contri- 
butions from other centers (e.g., Frankfurt, Zurich, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore), worldwide foreign exchange could possibly exceed $250 
billion per day or more than $60 trillion per year.3 With an order flow 
of this size, many times in excess of  world GNP and world trade, it 
becomes easy to understand the depth and speed of  the foreign ex- 
change market. 
For  comparison,  daily trading  volume in  New York  in  1977 was 
estimated to be only $5 billion, one-tenth of  the estimated volume in 
1986. The growth of trading in New York over this period was probably 
greater than that in London, and therefore overstates the worldwide 
growth in foreign exchange trading.  Nevertheless, foreign exchange 
trading clearly grew at a faster pace than other nominal magnitudes 
over this ten-year period. The figures for New York also indicate changes 
in the composition of trading, away from the Canadian dollar and cer- 
tain European currencies and toward the Japanese yen and the deutsche 
mark. 
The Eurocurrency market has a much shorter tenure than the foreign 
exchange market. The Eurocurrency  market, a market  for deposits 
denominated in a currency different from the indigenous currency of 
the financial center, began to take shape in the early 1960s. The Rus- 
sians played an important role in the early development of the market. 
They were reluctant in those cold war days to hold their U.S. dollars 
(needed for international trade transactions) in U.S.  accounts. Instead, 
they deposited their dollars in Paris with an affiliate of a state-owned, 
Russian bank.4 The true stimulus to the Eurocurrency market, how- 
ever,  was  the  differential regulation  between  offshore and  onshore 
banking operations. Particular U.S. banking regulations (i.e., interest 
rate ceilings on time deposits, mandatory reserve requirements held at 
zero interest, and mandatory deposit insurance) became increasingly 
costly throughout  the  1960s, resulting in a greater share of  banking 
activity being pushed  offshore. The innovation  in the Eurocurrency 
market is an example of  “unbundling”-in  this case, taking the ex- 
change risk of  one currency (the U.S. dollar, for example) and com- 
bining it with the regulatory climate and political risk of  another finan- 
cial center. 
The data in table 4.2 indicate the growth of the Eurocurrency deposit 
market, from roughly zero in  1960 to over $3.0 trillion on a gross basis 
and over $1.5 trillion on a net basis (netting out all interbank deposits) 
in  1986. The market, once exclusively dollar denominated, has now 
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Table 4.2  Dimensions of the Eurocurrency Deposit Market 
(billions of U.S.  dollars) 
Year 
Eurodollars  U.S. Money 







































































Compound growth  19.9%  20.1%  -  9.5% 
Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust,  World Financial Markets, various issues; Economic 
Report of  the President, 1986, table B-64. 
currencies of other industrialized countries making up the remainder 
of the market. The Eurocurrency market was once small enough to be 
ignored; today  it  rivals U.S. financial markets in terms of  size and 
importance. The short-term lending rate in the Eurocurrency market 
(LIBOR, or London Interbank Offer Rate) as it has been determined 
largely by free market forces, has become the reference rate for many 
onshore loan agreements, floating rate notes, and other contracts as 
well as Euromarket loans. 
Over the years, because of  its rapid growth and apparent lack of 
regulation,  the Euromarket has been feared by some as a source of 
macroeconomic  instability  or as a wobbly pyramid  prone  to crisis. 
Nearly all Eurocurrency banks are major players in their parents’ do- 
mestic market and could be subject to regulation via this angle. In 1974, 
central bankers from the Group of Ten issued a general statement of 
responsibility (the Basle Concordant) indicating that countries would 
extend lender-of-last-resort facilities for the solvency of their Euro- 
banks (see Dam 1982, 322-26).  The motivation here may have been to 
encourage national banking authorities to pay closer attention to their 
members’ Eurobanking operations and to reduce the public’s fear of 
an international banking panic. In 1980, the BIS announced another 
agreement requiring banks to produce consolidated statements of their 
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solidation would enable bank examiners to monitor the quality of off- 
shore lending on the same basis as domestic offices. 
Eurocurrency markets and Eurobanking operations have become a 
commonplace feature in international finance. In 1981, the United States 
acknowledged the importance of these new offshore markets and au- 
thorized the establishment of international banking facilities within ex- 
isting U.S. banking institutions. IBFs are not subject to the regulations 
that apply to domestic banking activity (reserve requirements and de- 
posit insurance, in particular) and are free to engage in many offshore 
banking arrangements with  nonresident^.^ 
The Eurobond market developed at approximately the same time as 
the market for Eurocurrency  deposits. Again, differential regulation 
between offshore and onshore securities activities played a key role in 
stimulating the development of the market. In 1963, the United States 
adopted the so-called interest equalization tax, effectively an excise 
tax on American purchases of new or outstanding foreign stocks and 
bonds.  To  no  one’s  surprise, the IET effectively  closed foreigners’ 
access to the U.S. bond market; to the surprise of some, the market 
simply migrated offshore to London and Luxembourg. Other costly 
U.S.  regulations (further international capital controls and a 30 percent 
withholding tax on interest payments to foreigners) nurtured the en- 
vironment for the Eurobond market. 
The remarkable growth record of the Eurobond market is presented 
in table 4.3.  From the first Eurobond floated in  1957, the volume of 
new offerings reached $6.3 billion in 1972. Two years later, the United 
States abolished the IET and its capital control program.  Eurobond 
underwritings plunged to $2.1 billion in  1974 and the financial press 
was anticipating the death of  the market.  But Eurobonds  and  U.S. 
bonds continued to differ in several important ways-investors  in Eu- 
robonds paid no withholding tax and held bearer securities, and issuers 
of  Eurobonds avoided costly and time-consuming SEC disclosure re- 
quirements. These differences proved  substantial, and the Eurobond 
market expanded sixtyfold in the next eleven years. 
New offerings in the U.S. dollar segment of the market now exceed 
the volume of new corporate bond issues in the United States. Treas- 
urers of  major corporations are now geared to conduct bond issues 
either offshore or onshore depending on market conditions. Even the 
U.S.  Treasury  has joined  the parade  to the Eurobond  market with 
several so-called targeted treasury issues, in  an attempt to lower the 
Treasury’s funding costs. 
4.2.2  Measures of Securitization 
The increase in securitization, the tendency for an economy to have 
a greater proportion of  its assets in the form of marketable securities 223  Financial Innovations in International Financial Markets 
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Table 4.3  Dimensions of the Eurobond Market (billions of  U.S. dollars) 
Eurobonds 
Foreign  Total International  U.S. Corporate 
Year  Total  $-Denominated  Bonds  Bond Issues  Bond Issues 
1970  3.0  -  1.6  4.6  29.0 
1971  3.6  -  2.6  6.3  30.1 
1972  6.3  3.9  3.4  9.7  25.6 
1973  4.2  2.4  3.6  7.8  20.7 
1974  2.1  1  .o  4.7  6.9  31.5 
1975  8.6  3.7  11.3  19.9  42.8 
1976  14.3  9.1  18.2  32.5  42.2 
1977  17.7  11.6  14.5  32.2  42.3 
1978  14.1  7.3  20.2  34.3  20.5 
1979  18.7  12.6  22.3  41 .O  26.5 
1980  24.0  16.4  17.9  41.9  44.6 
1981  31.6  26.8  21.4  53.0  38.2 
1982  51.6  44.0  26.4  78.0  45.4 
1983  48.5  38.4  27.8  76.3  50.2 
1984  79.5  63.6  28.0  107.4  59.6 
1985  136.7  97.8  31.0  167.8  71.3" 
1986 (Oct)b  163.4  102.7  30.7  194.1  n.a. 
Compound 
growthC  29.0%  28.1%  21.9%  27.1% 
Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, various issues; Economic Report of 
the President, 1986, table B-90. 
"First three quarters at annual rate. 
bThrough end of October, not annualized. 
=Through end of  1985. 
and bearing market-determined prices, can be seen from a variety of 
indicators. The par value of outstanding publicly traded bonds, as shown 
in table 4.4,  totaled roughly $7.8 trillion at the end of  1986, reflecting 
a 25 percent increase over 1985. Salomon Brothers (1986) estimates 
that about half of this increase is the result of the dollar's depreciation. 
But the nearly fivefold increase in the market value of  bonds relative 
to 1975 makes the long-term trend toward securitization apparent. The 
ratio of the market value of  bonds to GDP has risen from 50 percent 
in 1980 to 71 percent in 1985, showing another measure of increasing 
securitization. 
Another measure of  securitization and its implications is presented 
in table 4.5.  Net borrowings by U.S. nonfinancial corporations have 
traditionally  relied  heavily on bank  loans,  traditionally  a nontraded 
asset. In  1981 and 1982, bank  loans  and  securitized financing were 
roughly equal in magnitude; by 1986, more than three-quarters of net 
new financings were in a securitized form. One explanation for this 
phenomenon is that, for a variety of  reasons (but primarily a deterio- Table 4.4  Par Value of  Outstanding Publicly Issued Bonds (billions of  U.S. dollars) 
Annual 
Rate  Ratio to 
Year-End  Growth  % of Total 
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Total  $1,636  $3,566  $6,192  $7,776  14.2%  71% 
Source: Salomon Brothers 1986. 
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Table 4.5  Net Borrowing by  U.S. Nonfinancial Corporations 
(billions of  U.S. dollars) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Securitized financing  45.0  37.7  27.2  78.4  90.5  98.6 
Corporate bonds  28.1  44.2  24.6  55.3  77.0  90.5 
Bank loans  43.5  39.7  18.0  77.0  35.5  27.1 
Ratio of  securitized 
Open market paper  16.9  -6.5  2.6  23.1  13.5  8.1 
financing to bank loans  1.03  0.95  1.51  1.02  2.55  3.64 
Source: Salomon Brothers 1986. 55. 
ration in the quality of bank loan portfolios), the credit ratings of banks 
have fallen relative to their best customers. Corporations have observed 
that funding costs could be reduced by going directly to the market. 
As the most creditworthy customers are removed from a bank’s port- 
folio, this trend is reinforced. The trend toward securitization is also 
reinforced to the extent that investors value liquidity and are willing 
to purchase marketable securities at lower yields than a bank might 
charge on loans. 
The trend  toward  securitization in preference  to  traditional bank 
lending is also visible in the international markets. As shown in figure 
4.1, syndicated bank loans captured nearly 60 percent of  this market 
in 1982. In the years since, there has been a steady reduction in syn- 
dicated bank lending, along with a steady increase in international bond 
US$ bn 





1982  I98  3  1984  1984 
Fig. 4.1  International borrowing through syndicated bank loans ver- 
sus tradable bonds and notes. Source: Bank €or International 
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issues and note issuance facilities. The preference for borrowing through 
marketable securities seems to be firmly established. 
The market value of equity capital and its annual turnover provide 
further evidence on the securitization of international financial markets. 
The market value of  equity shares reached $5.3 trillion at the end of 
1986, up by 25  percent from  1985 and nearly  fivefold from 1975, as 
reported in  table 4.6. The U.S. share of the world market has fallen 
substantially since 1975, with Japan’s share rising by a nearly offsetting 
amount. The extent of securitization, as measured by the ratio of mar- 
ket value of  shares to GDP, shows considerable dispersion, from  13 
percent in France to 77 percent in Switzerland. The recent trend toward 
privitization, the  sale of  state-owned assets to private  investors, is 
helping to increase these measures of  securitization. Plans to dena- 
tionalize industries are in progress around the world. More than $19 
billion was raised through equity sales of state-owned enterprises in 
1986, roughly 25 percent of total new equity issues worldwide (Salomon 
Brothers 1986, 24). 
The final innovative trend that enhances securitization is the trans- 
formation of  formerly illiquid pools of  assets into tradable securities, 
using pass-through certificates or collateralized obligations as a struc- 
ture. GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association) pass-through 
certificates representing claims on a pool of GNMA-insured mortgages 
are perhaps the most well-known example, but other federal and private 
financial institutions began to issue similar certificates in the  1970s. 
New issues of asset-backed securities reached $269.0 billion in  1986, 
as reported  in table 4.7. Residential mortgages  remain the dominant 
component of this market. Securities representing commercial mort- 
gages are now available, as well as securities backed by automobile 
and credit card receivables at the shorter end of the maturity spectrum. 
4.2.3  New Risk Management and Funding Vehicles 
The extent of  financial innovation is perhaps best reflected in a set 
of new risk management and funding vehicles-futures,  options, and 
swaps-that  came into existence in  the early  1970s and have experi- 
enced extraordinary growth and importance beyond what the numerical 
entities may suggest. The aggregate open interest in financial futures 
and options, a measure of the speculative capital at risk in the market, 
rose to $680 billion at the end of September 1986, an increase of nearly 
75 percent over the year-end 1985 figure. Open interest, as reported in 
table 4.8, is split roughly two to one between  futures contracts and 
option contracts. Futures and options written against contracts on in- 
terest-bearing securities account for by far the greatest open interest, 
94 percent in the case of futures and 67 percent in the case of options. Table 4.6  Stock Market Value of Exchange-Listed Domestic Companies (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Annual 
% of Total  Growth 
Rate  Ratio to 
Year-End 
1975  1980  1985  1986a  1975-85  1975  1985  1985 GDP 
U.S. dollar  $704  $1,237  $2,014  $2,202  11.1%  61.2%  49.5%  51% 
Japanese yen  142  380  948  1,783  20.9  12.3  23.3  60 
205  354  384  15.2  7.5  8.7  70  U.K. sterling  86 
Deutsche mark  51  72  178  217  13.2  4.5  4.4  24 
Canadian dollar  51  117  157  163  12.0  4.4  3.9  47 
French franc  35  55  79  128  8.4  3.1  I .9  13 
Italian lira  11  25  58  112  18.3  0.9  1.4  15 
Swiss franc  17  43  84  97  17.7  1.4  2.1  77 
Dutch guilder  18  29  59  77  12.5  1.6  1.5  40 
Australian dollar  20  60  60  69  11.6  I .7  1.5  39 
Swedish krona  2  13  37  57  32.7  0.2  0.9  33 
Belgian franc  9  10  21  32  8.8  0.8  0.5  22 
Danish krone  4  6  15  15  13.9  0.4  0.4  22 
100.0  46%  Total  $1,150  $2,251  $4,065  $5,335  13.5%  100.0 
Source: Salomon Brothers 1986. 
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Table 4.7  Gross New Issues of Asset-Backed Securities 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
1980  1982  1984  1985  1986”  1987b 
Residential mortgage  22.0  55.0  66.7  114.0  253.3  217.0 
Commercial mortgage  -  -  1.3  6.0  5.6  7.0 
Automobile receivables  -  -  -  -  10.0  15.0 
Total  22.0  55.0  67.0  120.0  269.0  240.0 
-  .05  -  1 .o  Credit card receivables  -  -  -  -  - - - 
Source: Salomon Brothers 1986 
=Estimate. 
bForecast. 
Table 4.8  Aggregate Open Interest in Major World Financial Futures and 
Options Contracts (billions of U.S. dollars) 
~ 
1975  1980  1984  I985  1986:3 
Futures 
Interest rate contracts 
Bonds 
Money market 
Stock index contracts 
Currencies 
Options 
Interest rate contracts 
Bonds 
Money market 
Stock index contracts 
Currencies 


































































Source: Salornon Brothers 1986, 23. 
=Measured by dollar par or index value of outstanding positions on the last day of the 
period. 
Daily trading volume for futures and options contracts, reported in 
table 4.9, mirrors the above findings. The dominate share of  trading 
volume is in interest rate contracts, more so in the case of futures than 
in  options.  And among contracts on interest-bearing securities,  the 
three-month Eurodollar futures contract is by far the most popular, 
accounting for about 75 percent of  all activity. The three-month Eu- 
rodollar futures contract currently trades roughly fifty thousand to sev- 
enty-five thousand contracts per day, representing an aggregate face 
value of  $50-75  billion. The Eurodollar contract is useful for hedging 
LIBOR interest rate exposure, which, as noted earlier, has become the 
major reference rate for pricing variable-rate bank lending and floating- 
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Table 4.9  Aggregate Daily Trading Volume in Major World Financial Futures 
and Options Contracts (billions of U.S. dollars) 
1975  1980  1984  1985  1986:3 
Futures  0.0  25.3  55.1  86.0  134.6 
Interest rate contracts  0.0  24.2  46.7  73.4  115.9 
Bonds  0.0  6.0  11.9  25.7  57.9 
Money market  0.0  18.2  34.8  47.7  58.0 
Stock index contracts  0.0  0.0  5.5  8.9  14.4 
Currencies  0.0  1.1  2.9  3.7  4.3 
Options  0.0  0.0  8.2  24.5  34.4 
Interest rate contracts  0.0  0.0  1.9  1 I .5  16.3 
Bonds  0.0  0.0  1.9  6.5  6.7 
Money market  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  9.6 
Stock index contracts  0.0  0.0  6.0  12.3  15.6 
Currencies  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.7  2.5 
Aggregate trading volumea  0.0  25.4  63.2  110.5  169.0 
Source: Salomon Brothers 1986, 23. 
”Daily average of  the dollar par of  index value of  transactions. 
Another indicator of the potential impact of financial futures markets 
on trading behavior is illustrated in figure 4.2, which graphs the daily 
volume of Treasury bond futures trading and the volume of  trading in 
the underlying cash market. The data clearly show that the volume of 
trading in futures contracts now swamps the volume in the cash market 
by a factor of four. A similar ratio maintains between trading volume 
in  stock index futures and underlying equity shares. 
This development has raised  fears that  the heightened  activity in 
financial futures markets may be contributing to volatility in underlying 
cash markets. In particular, “program trading” (transactions executed 
to remove  arbitrage  profits  between  futures  and  cash  prices)  and 
20 
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Fig. 4.2  Average daily trading volume in Treasury bond futures and 
underlying cash bonds (billions of U.S. dollars). Source: First 
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“witching-hour effects” (related to the convergence of futures and cash 
prices on the expiration day of the contracts) have been cited as ex- 
amples of the disruptive power of the new financial futures and options 
markets. Careful studies need to examine these claims. Financial fu- 
tures and options markets offer investors a combination of  leverage 
and liquidity at exceedingly low transaction costs. When news occurs 
and expectations  change, investors may feel that it  is preferable to 
trade first in the futures market, leaving the cash market to adjust later 
in response.6 Other evidence suggests that the addition of the futures 
markets has raised the pool of  speculative capital in the market and 
that bid-offer spreads are lower in the cash market when the futures 
market is open (Miller 1986, 15). 
Interest rate and currency swaps, the final products in this overview, 
may be thought of as either risk management or funding vehicles. As 
part of a financing plan, a swap enables the borrower to unbundle the 
terms (currency, fixed rate, variable rate, and so forth) under which 
he initially raises funds from the financing terms he is ultimately seek- 
ing. For example, it is not obvious that a corporation seeking variable- 
rate dollar financing ought to borrow in the variable-rate dollar market.’ 
If  the corporation has a comparative advantage or a window of  op- 
portunity in  the fixed-rate DM  bond market, it might obtain a lower 
cost of funds by borrowing in this segment and swapping the proceeds 
into variable-rate dollar funds. The new financing alternative might be 
presented to the corporation as a package, allowing a comparison be- 
tween it and a straightforward issue of variable-rate dollar bonds. The 
alternatives could be identical in all respects, except that the package 
containing the swap carries the risk of default on the swap. 
Swaps can also be used as risk management tools to alter the currency 
of denomination and interest rate structure of assets and liabilities. If 
the above corporation decides that variable-rate dollar financing is no 
longer in  its best  interest, and it prefers fixed-rate DM  financing or 
fixed-rate Canadian dollar financing, the corporation can sell its swap 
or purchase  other swaps to alter its  position. This would likely be 
cheaper than redeeming its previous bond issue and incurring additional 
floatation costs.8 
The limited information available on swap activity is reported in table 
4.10. Information is incomplete because swaps are carried as off-bal- 
ance-sheet entries and no formal reporting is now required. The volume 
of interest rate swaps outstanding is estimated to be $300 billion. Cur- 
rency swaps associated with primary bond issues (so-called swap-dri- 
ven bond issues) were estimated at $38 billion in  1986, or about 20 
percent of new Eurobond issues. Other asset- or liability-based cur- 
rency swaps were estimated to be as large as $76 billion in 1986. 231  Financial Innovations in International Financial Markets 
Table 4.10  Interest Rate and Currency Swap Activity 
Interest Rate Swaps  Currency Swaps" 




























Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust,  World Financial  Markets, December 1986; Salomon 
Brothers 1986, 23. 
aTotal amount outstanding at end of period in billions of U.S. dollars. 
hNumber of  contracts concluded during period. 
CEstimated. 
4.3  Characteristics of Recent Financial Innovations 
4.3.1  Functions of International Financial Markets and 
Alternative Taxonomies 
Innovation takes place when it becomes profitable to better fulfill 
any of the major functions of the international financial sector. These 
functions  include  (i) providing  appropriate  instruments  for  making 
payments,  (ii) facilitating  monetary  exchange  between  currencies, 
(iii) facilitating the flow of savings toward investments across national 
boundaries, and (iv) providing mechanisms for allocating, diversifying, 
and compensating for risk.  A partial list of  new financial products, 
classified by their intermediation function, is presented in table 4.11. 
It may  be useful to explore these innovations further using several 
alternative taxonomies. 
Dufey and Giddy (198  1) have argued that most financial innovations 
are either aimed at circumventing government regulations or taken in 
response to perceived relative price or relative risk changes. Govern- 
ment policies-in  particular, regulations that are not applied uniformly 
across all parties or countries, and tax rates that are not uniform across 
different sources and uses of income-provide  a fertile ground for the 
innovative process.  Financial theory  suggests that securities can be 
used to transform income from higher-taxed into lower-taxed forms, 
but the transformation is c~stly.~  Individuals monitor the implied bur- Table 4.11  A Classification of  Innovations by Financial Intermediation Function 
Function 
Price-Risk  Credit-Risk  Liquidity  Credit  Equity 








Asset sales without recourse 
Loan swaps 
Securitized assets 
Transferable loan contracts 
Sweep accounts and other 
Negotiable money-market 
Money-market mutual funds 
Zero coupon bonds 
“Junk”  bonds 
Equity participation financing 
Mandatory convertible debentures 
Off-balance-sheet 
Futures  X 
Options and loan caps  X 
Swaps  X  X 
Forward rate arrangements  X 
Letters of credit  X 
Note issuance facilities  X  X  X 
Credit-enhancing guarantees 
on securities  X  X 
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den of differential taxation and regulation, and shift their activities when 
the cost-benefit ratio is favorable. Dufey and Giddy argue that in the 
1960s, the regulatory burden of the U.S. financial system became too 
costly, providing the incentive for the development of the Eurocurrency 
and  Eurobond  markets.  In  the  1970s,  macroeconomic volatility  in- 
creased the cost of carrying exposure, leading to a dramatic increase 
in the demand for risk management vehicles. 
Another well-known taxonomy is the distinction between “product” 
and “process”  innovations. The modern tradition of financial product 
innovation migbt begin with the negotiable time certificates of deposit 
introduced in the 1960s and include exchange-traded foreign currency 
futures contracts and equity option contracts introduced in  1972 and 
1973  respectively.  The innovative process has  exploded  since then. 
Exchange-traded financial futures and options contracts, which were 
virtually nonexistent in 1970, now cover dozens of securities and syn- 
thetic instruments (e.g., the S&P index) and are traded in at least nine 
countries on four continents. Active over-the-counter or interbank mar- 
kets exist for other products. Some products  are generic and fairly 
standardized (e.g., a spot DM contract or a fixed-rate currency swap). 
Other products have taken on proprietary names (e.g., CARS, certif- 
icates on automobile receivables, from Salomon Brothers) to afford 
some differentiated  characteristics  to products  that  can be  imitated 
fairly easily. This kind of product differentiation may enable the in- 
novating firm to appropriate a larger share of the returns from inno- 
vation, but it also may require the firm to invest heavily in a secondary 
market for its differentiated securities. 
Modern examples of  process innovations include the SWIFT (So- 
ciety for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers) network for foreign 
exchange payments, the grey market (or premarket) in Eurobond trad- 
ing, the Euro-clear and Cede1 systems for clearing Eurobonds, the 
MESA network for clearing ECU transactions, and the establishment 
of formal linkages and dual listings between U.S. and foreign stock 
and commodity exchanges. The European Monetary System (EMS) 
might be viewed as a process innovation intended to stabilize European 
exchange rates and, in turn, facilitate the use of the ECU. 
The Black-Scholes option-pricing model and other related models 
might also be thought of as process innovations. This line of theoretical 
research  (i) provided  a  scientific  underpinning  for  option  pricing, 
(ii) indicated how option writers might manage their risks by  “delta 
hedging,” (iii) helped popularize a technique for pricing synthetic con- 
tracts (i.e., the replicating portfolio approach), and (iv) alerted analysts 
to the fact that many common financial contracts could be usefully 
viewed as embodying option-like features (that might be priced  “sci- 
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ucts and market-making activity. To take one example, Dufey and Giddy 
(1 981) noted  that  despite articles  describing  the benefits  of  foreign 
exchange options, the market appeared to be failing because the con- 
tracts were too specialized and too difficult to hedge. Since banks will 
generally be  selling call options to corporate customers, there is no 
obvious place for banks to buy options to mechanically square their 
books. The “delta hedging” procedure offered a reasonable alternative 
for risk management, which has enabled the interbank foreign exchange 
option market to develop.  lo 
The theory of finance suggests another approach for understanding 
the recent wave of financial innovations. Investors and borrowers are 
typically characterized as risk-averse welfare maximizers. In this set- 
ting, we expect that individuals will desire the flexibility to hedge against 
any contingent  risk. If  the available set of  financial assets does not 
“span” all possible contingencies, then individuals might be better off 
having access to additional securities whose payoffs depend on these 
contingencies. The introduction of interest rate futures, heating oil and 
crude  oil futures, and mortgage-backed  securities might be  seen as 
products that help complete the menu of  financial products, thus al- 
lowing individuals to reach their desired exposure to particular risks. 
Some of these innovations represent an “unbundling”  of  existing fi- 
nancial products. ll Other new products, such as pass-through certifi- 
cates, are simply tradable claims collateralized by previously existing 
financial positions, a process of financial disintermediation that closes 
the gap between ultimate borrowers and lenders. 
Conditional on their exposure to risk, individuals also seek to max- 
imize their expected investment returns, taking into account taxes and 
the transaction costs of  managing their positions. Many new financial 
products (e.g., money market mutual funds, stock index options, and 
convertible bonds)  represent  a composition  or “bundling”  of  more 
elementary financial instruments. Small investors have historically been 
attracted to mutual funds as a way to attain diversification and scale 
economies, which lower the cost of financial services, including profes- 
sional management  expertise. But  now  large, institutional investors 
have become attracted to composite products because they dramati- 
cally lower the cost of establishing and maintaining a leveraged position 
or acting upon fast-breaking news.’* 
A single innovation could draw on many of  the characteristics just 
enumerated. The evolution of zero-coupon securities provides a good 
case in point.13  Zero-coupon securities had existed for some time (e.g., 
Treasury bills and U.S. savings bonds). In the 1970s, aggressive reading 
of  the federal tax code (regulatory channel) encouraged dealers and 
investors to separate (unbundle) the principal and coupon components 
of Treasury securities as distinct products. By  selling the corpus at a 
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this instrument, an investor might delay paying taxes until the security 
had matured or was sold. Taxable corporations also had an incentive 
to issue long-term zero-coupon bonds because of  the Treasury’s method 
of computing implicit interest expense. Even after the Treasury plugged 
these loopholes, demand for zero-coupon instruments persisted from 
foreign investors, who faced more favorable capital gains tax treatment 
on zeros, and from domestic investors, who used zeros to match future 
liabilities,  eliminate reinvestment  risk  (hedging motives), and  avoid 
bothering with coupons (convenience motive). The securities industry 
responded to this demand by stripping the coupons from existing se- 
curities, creating synthetic zeros (unbundling), some with exotic (and 
proprietary) names. In January 1985 the U.S.  Treasury responded with 
its own innovation by announcing that all future issues with a maturity 
of  greater than ten  years would be transferable in their component 
pieces. The new product, STRIPS (separate trading of registered in- 
terest and principal securities), has been readily accepted with more 
than $90 billion of securities outstanding. 
4.3.2  Engineering Innovative Financial Instruments 
Swaps and Comparative Advantages 
To  set the stage for our later analysis, it is useful to point out the 
reciprocal nature of demand for swaps and other hedging instruments. 
This is clear from the typical diagrams used to illustrate the flows of 
funds in a swap transaction. For example, 
(i) demand for five-year sterling t)  supply of five-year dollars; 
(ii) demand for fixed-rate funds -  supply of floating-rate funds; and 
(iii) demand  for LIBOR-basis funds t)  supply of  N.Y. Prime-basis 
The above situations are analogous to commodity trade in the sense 
that one country’s demand for wheat is equivalent to its supply of cloth 
under the presumption that trade balances. A stylized result from clas- 
sical trade theory is that countries are endowed with differential sup- 
plies of  (immobile) capital and labor which gives rise to production 
cost differentials. To take advantage of the situation, countries tend to 
specialize  in  the production of  their comparative advantage goods, 
which they then trade, capturing the gains from trade. 
The principles underlying a financial swap bear a strong relationship 
to those of commodity trade and comparative advantage theory.  l4 The 
feasibility of  a swap (such as in cases i, ii, and iii) between parties A 
and B hinges on the possibility that they face different relative costs 
on the two pieces of the swap. The following example uses an interest 
rate swap, but the same principle would apply to a currency  swap. 
Suppose that company A desires to borrow fixed-rate funds while com- 
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pany B desires floating-rate funds. Suppose further that the companies 
can borrow on the following terms: 
Company A  Company B  Differential 
Fixed rate  11%  9.5%  1.5% 
Floating rate  LIBOR  + 0.5%  LIBOR  + 0.25%  0.25% 
I .25% 
Comparative  Floating-rate  Fixed-rate 
Objective  Fixed-rate  Floating-rate 
advantage  funds  funds 
funds  funds 
Company B borrows at a lower rate in either case (it has an absolute 
advantage in both markets), but its relative or comparative advantage 
lies in the fixed-rate market. (A’s  comparative advantage is in the float- 
ing-rate market.) It can be easily shown that if A borrows at floating- 
rate terms and B borrows at fixed-rate terms and the companies then 
swap, there will be a 1.25 percent interest rate savings to divide between 
the two firms and any financial intermediaries who assist them. 
What  is the  source of  B’s comparative advantage?  A  number of 
reasons might explain it: (1) Certain lenders (e.g., insurance compa- 
nies) are constrained to lend to companies like B. Therefore, there is 
an excess supply of funds chasing firms like B. (2) Fixed-rate lenders 
are segmented from floating-rate lenders, and they have formed dif- 
ferent expectations regarding A and B. (3) The assets and receivables 
of B are predominantly in fixed-rate terms. Consequently, lenders per- 
ceive lower risk associated with fixed-rate lending to B. If explanations 
(1) or (2) are behind B’s comparative advantage, then for “small trans- 
actions,” B may exploit its comparative advantage without losing it, 
much the same as commodity trade. In the aggregate, however, large- 
scale transacting would remove the segmentation barrier at the heart 
of this swap transaction. On the other hand, if explanation (3) is valid, 
the market may be signaling its preference to provide fixed-rate terms. 
If company B borrows at fixed-rate terms and swaps, the market may 
perceive that B is in a riskier position and turn its relative (fixedifloating) 
borrowing terms against it. In this case, B has traded away or reduced 
its comparative borrowing advantage. Explanation (3) clearly shows 
the need for disclosure of information on swap transactions so that the 
market can offer relative  financing terms that are consistent with a 
firm’s financial risks. 
Several related issues can be raised by examining a currency swap. 
In the  1960s  and  1970s, back-to-back  loans and parallel loans (with 
cash flows essentially the same as a currency swap) were conducted 
to avoid the United  Kingdom’s investment sterling market or Latin 
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A/R: $ long-term 
forward purchase 
IBM swap in August  1981  as the beginning of the modern currency 
swap market. The funding and risk management strategy of the World 
Bank at that time called for borrowing in DM, Swiss francs, and other 
low-interest-rate currencies. In these smaller markets, repeated bond 
issues can cause lending terms to deteriorate as domestic buyers reach 
a saturation point  (sometimes the result  of  prudential regulation) in 
their portfolios. 
In the August  1981  deal, IBM borrowed DM  and Swiss francs at 
preferential rates (because of IBM’s credit rating and scarcity value), 
the World Bank borrowed  dollars (without concern over market sat- 
uration), and the two parties then swapped the proceeds and the future 
obligations to make payments.l5 Each company exploited its compar- 
ative borrowing advantage and shared the gains from trade to produce 
a lower all-in cost of funds. The World  Bank has continued to use 
currency swaps aggressively as an integral part of its funding strategy. 
AJP:  Euro-$ Bond 
A/R: DM long-term 
forward sale 
Building Synthetic Securities 
Two further examples illustrate other aspects of the innovation pro- 
cess. Suppose that a market for short-term, unsecured borrowing sim- 
ilar to the U.S. commercial paper market, but denominated in DM, 
does not exist. Absent this market, companies can instead issue U.S. 
dollar commercial paper, sell the proceeds for DM, and cover by selling 
DM forward in exchange for dollars. The T-account in the first half of 
figure 4.3 demonstrates how these two transactions approximate a DM 
commercial paper instrument. The cost of funding in DM terms would 
be approximately the actual U.S. dollar commercial paper rate (for a 
Euro-DM Commercial Paper 




AIR  $ forward 
purchase 
Euro-DM  Bonds 
Assets 
AJP:  $Commercial  Paper 
AJP:  DM forward sale 
Liabilities 
Construction of  synthetic securities: Euro-DM commercial paper 
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particular maturity and credit risk) plus the forward premium on foreign 
exchange.  16 
The gain from “constructing”  DM commercial paper in this fashion 
might be measured by comparing the synthetic rate with the best al- 
ternative DM rate, perhaps a short-term Euro-DM loan. Synthetic DM 
commercial paper appears to offer a perfect substitute for “actual” 
DM commercial paper. Figure 4.4 shows that the savings from issuing 
constructed DM commercial paper were in the 30-90  basis pont rate 
during the early  1980s. An actual market for DM  commercial paper 
will  develop only if  savings on transaction costs (including liquidity 
factors) warrant. If, in fact, a DM commercial paper market develops, 
actual prices must be set close to synthetic values so as to preclude 
arbitrage. Similarities between actual and synthetic commercial paper 
prices will not indicate that the gains from financial trade have vanished, 
only that  the gains are now  embodied  directly  in  the  interest rates 
themselves. Using synthetic commercial paper helps secure these gains 
from financial trade permanently. 
A related example is the Eurobond market for DM, Swiss francs, 
and other currencies which at times in the recent past has been subject 
to queuing restrictions by national officials. Queuing imposes costs on 
a firm by restricting its ability to access the bond market at times when 
terms may be particularly favorable. The T-accounts in the bottom half 
of figure 4.3 demonstrate how the proceeds from a Eurodollar bond 
can be swapped for DM (or other currencies) to create a long-term DM 
obligation that approximates a Euro-DM bond. The cost of the con- 
structed Euro-DM bond would be approximately the U.S. dollar Eu- 
robond rate (for a particular maturity and risk class) plus the applicable 
forward premium on foreign exchange.  l7 
The gain from constructing a Euro-DM bond in this fashion could 
be measured by comparing the constructed rate with the rate that might 
be obtained once the firm was allowed access to the actual Euro-DM 
Fig. 4.4 
-80  40E 
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Comparative spread relationship: Euro-DM rate minus con- 
structed DM commercial paper rate (ninety-day term at per- 
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bond market at sometime in the future. If  the synthetic Euro-DM bond 
approach offers a liquid market, then queuing restrictions lose their 
force and countries would be inclined to drop these restrictions. Ar- 
bitrage would then insure that the current actual Euro-DM bond rate 
approximates the synthetic Euro-DM bond rate. By forcing these two 
rates toward equality, borrowers would enjoy permanent relief from 
queuing costs and other market access barriers. 
Contract Innovation 
A final area of financial innovation worth noting is in the design of 
futures contracts. Black (1986) has modeled the success and failure of 
futures contracts based on their commodity characteristics, their con- 
tract characteristics, and the interaction of these two variables. Com- 
modity  characteristics  include  the durability,  storability,  and homo- 
geneity of the commodity as well as characteristics of the spot market. 
Contract characteristics refer to contract size, delivery dates, delivery 
locations,  acceptable commodity grades for delivery,  and  so  forth. 
Delivery conditions play a large role in contract specifications because 
even though most short contract positions are liquidated by offset, 
some physical delivery of the underlying commodity does take place. 
The most important change in contract specification to affect futures 
trading has been to allow for cash settlement of futures contracts upon 
their expiration, rather than to require costly delivery  of physicals. 
This innovation might have been adopted years ago except that a con- 
tract that could be settled only in cash was considered a wager and 
specifically outlawed in  those  states with major futures markets.  In 
1974, futures trading came under federal control (via the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission), where no such rules regarding gambling 
were in effect. By 1981, all the regulatory channels had been cleared, 
and financial futures contracts specifying cash settlement began trad- 
ing. The vast appeal of  these new contracts is evident from the data 
on trading volume and open interest reviewed earlier. 
4.3.3  Design and Evolution of Innovative Financial Instruments 
Cooper (1986) has recently argued that in most new financial instru- 
ments, the underlying financial claims embodied in the contract are 
largely the same as in the past; what has changed is the packaging of 
the instruments as well as the speed, scope, and other aspects of the 
trading arrangements. As illustrated in the above examples, new  fi- 
nancial contracts are often a transformation of existing financial in- 
struments. This technique,  the  “replicating  portfolio”  approach, is 
central to the design of new financial instruments and to their pricing. 
Examination of many new instruments reveals that they reflect a bun- 
dling or unbundling of existing securities which allows them to replicate 
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Our examples demonstrate that new instruments may also replicate 
securities that do not exist but that the market may welcome (e.g., DM 
commercial paper or DM bonds without queuing restrictions). In prin- 
ciple, a security could be indexed to any contingent outcome in order 
to replicate any desired financial contract, although in practice it might 
have to be issued offshore to avoid prohibitive regulations. l8 
Once the general principle behind a financial innovation is well known 
(either its transaction costs savings or its risk-reducing properties), the 
possibility exists to move the product from a custom-design, small- 
volume market to a standardized product with high volume and lower 
transaction  costs.  This  has  been  the  evolution  in  several cases, as 
illustrated in table 4.12, for the currency and interest-rate swap market. 
Product  innovation  is not a one-way  street. There  are numerous 
examples of failure among exchange-traded futures  contracts which 
illustrates that these products, like consumer goods, must  meet  the 
market test.  l9 Product innovation is costly, and because financial firms 
value their reputations and intend to be infinite-lived, we expect that 
new products  will  offer value-added, at least in  the  short run.  But 
because financial innovations are likely to incorporate increasing com- 
plexity, it is essential for nonfinancial  firms to gain the necessary ex- 
pertise to evaluate the new products. And for these nonfinancial firms 
(as for regulatory authorities) it is essential that the evaluation be con- 
ducted on the basis of economic, risk-return criteria rather than ac- 
counting conventions. 
4.4  Causes of Financial Market Innovation 
4.4.1 
To  better understand the role of  swaps and other new financial in- 
struments in the real world, it is useful to outline the nature of financial 
Financial Services under Perfect Capital Markets 
Table 4.U  Evolution of the Currency and Interest Rate Swap Market 
Date  Phase  Trading Arrangement  Volume 
1970s  Arbitrage of 
regulation 
1980-8 I  Arbitrage of  market 
anomalies (1) 
1982-83  Arbitrage of market 
anomalies (2) 
1984  Standardized traded 
swaps 
1985-  Derivative agreements 
on swaps (forward 
swaps, swap options) 
Parallel loans  Small 
Intermediated agreements  Small 
Intermediated with bank  $20 billion 
inventories 
Market making on standard 
contracts 
Market making on standard  $200-300 
contracts  billion 
$100 billion 
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services that would exist in  a  “perfect”  capital market.  I will then 
argue that departures from “perfect”  capital markets provide the nec- 
essary conditions for the development of new financial products such 
as swaps, options, and so forth. 
For our purposes, the essential elements of a perfect capital market 
are (i) no transaction costs; (ii) no taxes; (iii) no regulatory barriers or 
restraints (but enforceable contracts); and (iv) a large number of small 
participants. Uncertainty regarding future economic outcomes is pres- 
ent, but investors view the future similarly.20  The absence of transaction 
costs insures that all investors share the same information base and 
that they will agree on a fair valuation of  securities. No  transaction 
costs also implies that borrowers and lenders can act directly in the 
market  without  depending on  agents or intermediaries.  Finally,  no 
transaction costs implies that securities are completely divisible and 
may be issued in arbitrarily small units. 
To complete the story, we assume that investors are risk-averse and 
attempting to maximize their expected utility from lifetime consump- 
tion. Two questions are of interest: What financial instruments will be 
offered in the market and how will individuals and firms utilize these 
instruments? 
In this stylized setting, investors will desire the flexibility to hedge 
against any contingent risk.  It can be shown that if  there are n inde- 
pendent sources of  risk, then n financial instruments related to these 
sources of  risk are sufficient for agents to form any portfolio of their 
choosing.2’ There could be more than  n financial instruments in the 
market, but these would represent combinations of the original n and 
would therefore be redundant. The financial market could be labeled 
“complete”  in the sense that investors could hedge against any con- 
tingent risk and form a portfolio with any risk-return pattern. 
In a perfect and complete market, any borrower or issuer could enter 
the market and directly sell financial instruments (i.e., a loan, option, 
or some other well-defined contract) for fair value. A lender or investor, 
on the other hand, could expect to find financial instruments capable 
of hedging any risk and enabling him to achieve any desired risk-return 
pattern. In a perfect and complete market, the menu of  financial in- 
struments allows everyone complete flexibility to meet their desired 
financial objectives. 
4.4.2  Financial Services with Imperfect Capital Markets 
The assumptions of perfect capital markets are substantially at odds 
with the real world. A variety of barriers exist that potentially might 
lead to departures from the various arbitrage and parity  conditions 
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assumptions. The most basic such parity condition is a variant of the 
law of one price applied to the financial market-similar  securities (or 
combinations of securities) representing similar exposures to risk ought 
to sell for the  same price  regardless of  the point  of  sale. This law 
predicts, for example, that an IBM seven-year straight U.S.  dollar bond 
floated in London ought to command the same price as a similar security 
floated in New York or Tokyo. A financial market law of one price is, 
in essence, a statement about the integration of international capital 
markets and that capital flows (i.e., arbitrage) will take place to equalize 
currency-adjusted and risk-adjusted rates of  return everywhere. 
Real-world market imperfections  can be divided into two groups: 
policy-related (or man-made) and behavioral (natural) barriers. Policy- 
related  imperfections  include taxes, rules regarding information dis- 
closure or accounting conventions, and other regulatory barriers. The 
latter includes factors such as reserve requirements in banking, interest 
rate ceilings, market access rules (e.g., queuing), ownership restrictions 
on shares, legality of a monetary unit and other financial instruments 
(e.g.,  ECU-denominated debts and bearer securities), and rules  re- 
garding market entry and permissible activities (e.g., the Glass-Steagall 
Act). These national regulations are promulgated with diverse objec- 
tives in mind-domestic monetary control, the safety and soundness 
of the banking system, prudential management of pension and mutual 
funds, and desired competitive conditions in the financial services in- 
dustry. The critical point here is that the incidence of the policy-related 
barriers is not similar across the world’s capital markets, or even within 
a single capital market. Consequently these barriers lead to segmen- 
tation effects both between national capital markets and within indi- 
vidual markets. 
Other capital market  barriers  are more  a function of  the  natural 
economic  environment  or  human  behavioral  patterns.  Transaction 
costs-of bringing a new security to market, of  discovering and veri- 
fying information regarding an issuer, of enforcing contracts-are  an 
obvious natural barrier to complete integration of international capital 
markets. Perhaps as a result of different information sets, investors in 
different national markets may hold different expectations, resulting in 
different assessments of securities prices. And investors in different 
countries might have different age and income profiles, leading to dif- 
ferent consumption/investment/risk preferences and, therefore, to dif- 
ferent prices of similar securities across countries. 
All of these barriers, whether policy related or natural, encourage 
the segmentation of international capital markets and the possibility 
that returns on similar securities (or portfolios of securities) may not 
equalize across countries.  As  a  result, profit  opportunities  present 
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low cost.22  In addition, barriers also reduce the number and variety of 
securities below the level observed in perfect and complete markets. 
Profit opportunities also exist for agents who can create new instru- 
ments at low cost for hedging otherwise exposed risks.23 
The above line of reasoning suggests that as long as investors are 
risk-averse utility maximizers, they will continue to search out arbitrage 
profit opportunities and to demand more complete financial markets. 
Demand for financial vehicles is always present, but with the existence 
of costly barriers, demand will be scaled by price and only a subset of 
financial vehicles will exist. What Ian Cooper (1986) called the proxi- 
mate causes of financial innovation (i.e., the search for lower trans- 
action costs, funding costs, new risk-transferring vehicles, and so forth) 
are always lurking. Why then has there been a surge in financial in- 
novation over the last several years? 
The simple answer to this question is that a set of  factors (what 
Cooper labels the ultimate causes of innovation) has led to a substantial 
outward shift in both the demand and supply schedules for new financial 
products and processes. On the demand side, rising nominal and real 
funding costs in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased the willingness 
of borrowers to search out lower-cost funding. Volatility of asset prices, 
exchange rates, and inflation rates increased the price that investors 
and borrowers would pay for protection against these risks. Changing 
worldwide wealth patterns and the globalization of industrial markets 
increased the demand for global asset portfolios or funding strategies. 
Demand was also probably heightened by user education and advances 
such as option-pricing models. 
On the supply side, advances in telecommunications and computer 
technology, increasing competition among financial intermediaries, and 
regulatory  changes all combined  to reduce  the transaction  costs of 
creating new financial instruments  and offering market-making  ser- 
vices. The impact of regulatory change cuts in two ways: permission 
to begin trading in financial futures and options clearly helped these 
instruments to develop, but persistence  of other regulatory  barriers 
most likely encouraged the search for close substitutes or parallel mar- 
kets in order to overcome these barriers. Regulatory encouragement 
to increase the capital adequacy of banks and their return on assets is 
also credited as promoting the securitization of existing bank assets 
and the shift into new financial products that lead to off-balance-sheet 
exposures. 
Distinguishing between demand and supply factors may be somewhat 
artificial because of the reciprocal nature of financial products-ne 
side of  the transaction cannot proceed without the other. The global- 
ization of industrial activity suggests that it should be more common 
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kets, units of account, and under diverse terms. The market for financial 
intermediary services has been responsive to link together the demand 
and  supply for particular  products.  As noted  earlier,  the  supply  of 
intermediary services itself has followed an evolutionary process from 
specialty deals, to brokering,  and finally to market-making  in  stan- 
dardized products. The financial services industry appears particularly 
well suited to overcome some of the unique barriers (such as default 
risk, see n. 22) present in international capital markets. 
4.5  Implications of  Innovation on Financial Market Prices and 
Market Behavior 
The process of financial market innovation that I have been describ- 
ing leads directly to a number of  important economic consequences. 
In this section, I outline the major effects on financial asset prices, 
international price relationships, and market behavior that we would 
expect to observe as a result of the innovative process. Then I review 
the empirical evidence on internationalization and integration  of markets. 
Given the steady financial innovation over the last two decades and 
the substantial amount of activity in these new markets, we should be 
able to observe and measure the following major economic differences: 
a. Lower transaction costs, greater liquidity, greater substituta- 
bility between domestic financial products 
b. Wider array of financial products giving improved opportunities 
for  transfer  of  risks  and  risk  optimization  within  investor 
portfolios 
c. Securitization of assets as investors value liquidity, financial 
disintermediation 
d. Improved opportunities for funding riskier credits 
e. Greater competition for financial services business 
a. Greater international capital mobility, existing barriers removed 
b. Greater  integration  of  international  capital  markets,  less 
c. Greater  similarity between  cost  of  funds (currency and risk 
1. Financial market behavior 
2. International financial market relationships 
or more easily circumvented 
segmentation 
adjusted) in alternative capital market locations 
3.  Macroeconomic effects 
a. Fewer opportunities for pursuing national monetary and poli- 
cies using quantitative controls on credit availability or interest 
rate levels 
b. Greater impact of  monetary policy on exchange rates and ex- 
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Central to the above hypotheses are the reduction in transaction costs 
because of supply-side factors (e.g., technological and regulatory change) 
and  demand  factors (e.g.,  scale economies and the development of 
secondary markets for new products). Arbitrage plays a key role in the 
process. As both borrowers and lenders monitor the risk-return prop- 
erties of their portfolios in the face of a new menu of  securities, ex- 
pected  rates of  return on securities (adjusted  for currency  and risk 
factors) should be brought into closer conformity-that  is, market in- 
tegration. Arbitrage, as well as the creation of new synthetic securities, 
acts to reduce the burden of market imperfections. The greater simi- 
larity  of  capital market  products  across countries  and their greater 
integration imply reduced scope for pursuing monetary and credit pol- 
icies based on quantitative restrictions on credit or interest rate ceilings. 
They also suggest that as monetary policies differ across countries, 
exchange rate volatility will increase in response to capital mobility 
and portfolio rebalancing by borrowers and investors. 
As these financial market transactions are completely voluntary, all 
those who directly participate should be better off as a result. These 
transactions enable borrowers and lenders to hold more desirable port- 
folios, given that they face lower transaction costs and an expanded 
opportunity set of  financial instruments. For these players, capital al- 
locations will be more in line with economic risk-return criteria. This 
should be a force tending to increase economic (allocational) efficiency, 
but other factors (discussed in the next section) may act in the opposite 
direction. 
In  his analysis of  recent innovation in Japanese financial markets, 
Felc  nan (1986) suggests three approaches for measuring the degree of 
internationalization of a financial market. The legal approach focuses 
on the extent to which the law provides the right and opportunity for 
cross-border capital flows. The quantity approach posits that a larger 
volume of  cross-border transactions is associated with greater inter- 
nationalization. The price approach is the most exacting. It posits that 
the internationalization  of  a market is complete when its prices are 
brought into an international equilibrium. Feldman takes the interest 
rate parity relationship as his standard; when deviations from covered 
interest parity are small, markets are assumed to be integrated under 
the price approach. 
What evidence is available to observe whether these financial market 
and macroeconomic effects listed earlier are actually taking place? The 
most obvious piece of evidence comes from the scope of new financial 
instruments and their trading activity outlined in section 4.2. The legal 
framework has been built to permit trading in a wide variety of financial 
futures and options contracts. The legal framework for swap transac- 
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dardize various provisions and wordings of swap  arrangement^.^^ And 
many transactions have moved offshore, where the legal impediments 
to contract design and market entry are less severe. If we use quantity 
as a criteria, it is clear that these new securities play an important role 
in investors’ portfolios. 
On the international side, we also observe legal or institutional agree- 
ments that promote international linkages. Some companies have listed 
their securities on several exchanges around the world for years. Recent 
evidence suggests that this practice may be especially beneficial for 
firms from smaller countries which list their shares in the United States. 
Alexander and Eun (1985) conclude that the effect of  dual listing on 
share price is greater for firms from smaller countries (e.g., Australia) 
that were more segmented from the US.  capital market. As these dual- 
listed firms experience a price effect, arbitrage pricing suggests that 
other non-dual-listed firms may show a sympathetic price response, 
further integrating the international markets. 
A variation on this theme is the recent agreement linking the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the Singapore International Mone- 
tary  Exchange (SIMEX). A futures position  established on one ex- 
change may be offset and closed with transactions on the other ex- 
change. This linkage expands the number of hours of trading per day, 
which can be useful when prices are extremely volatile.25 
Two kinds of evidence concern the integration of prices in interna- 
tional markets. The first addresses the law of one price for international 
securities. The dramatic growth of the Eurobond market suggests that 
many companies  (as well as the United  States Treasury) are “arbi- 
traging”  the funding differences  between  the offshore and  onshore 
markets. The funding advantage of  Eurobonds, which was estimated 
by Kidwell, Marr, and Trimble (1986) to be in the 70-140  basis point 
range in the 1977-81  period, declined to the 30-60  basis point range 
by 1983. A later study by Mahajan and Fraser (1986) examined ninety- 
two matched pairs of offerings in the Eurobond and U.S.  bond markets 
between 1975 and 1983. Mahajan and Fraser concluded that once they 
had standardized for issuer, maturity, rating, and coupon, they could 
not reject the hypothesis that yields were similar in the two markets. 
This suggests an integration and harmonization of terms between the 
two markets.26 The second source of  evidence on the integration of 
international prices comes from tests of the interest rate parity con- 
dition and the existence of  covered interest arbitrage profits.  It has 
long been  understood  that  covered  interest  arbitrage integrates the 
short-term Eurocurrency markets,*’ but it is now becoming more ap- 
parent that longer-term Eurocurrency markets, commercial paper mar- 
kets (recall fig. 4.4), and onshore short-term financial markets are also 
being integrated  by  actual or potential  arbitrage.28 Feldman’s (1986) 
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Deviations from covered  interest panty: Eurodollar versus 
Japanese gensakis, three-month rates. Source: Feldman 1986, 
182. 
the incentives for covered interest arbitrage between Eurodollar and 
gensaki instruments over the 1977-84  period.29 Feldman argues that 
the deviation became insignificant in  mid- to late  1981, suggesting a 
rise in internationalization. In addition, market professionals suggest 
that gains from interest rate and currency swaps are now relatively 
small, indicating that these markets provide for a high degree of integration 
in international capital markets (Morgan Guaranty Trust 1986, 3). 
4.6  Policy Implications of Financial Market Innovation 
The picture being painted  sounds rosy, which should not be very 
surprising.  If  we begin with a market paradigm  and open up  more 
possibilities of  choice and freedom for borrowers  and lenders, in a 
potential sense, the world economy stands to be better off. Financial 
innovations act to overcome many of the natural barriers that divide 
and segment markets, and lead to allocational inefficiencies. But in- 
novations also overcome many of the policy-related regulatory barriers 
that were put in place as safeguards or for particular policy objectives. 
Concern about the recent wave of financial innovation centers around 
two themes: first, that increased reliance on the market mechanism- 
and the possibility of asset price overshooting, excessive competition 
among financial players,  increased credit linkages between financial 
intermediaries, and anonymous market linkages between ultimate bor- 
rowers and lenders-may  expose the financial system to additional risk 
in the aggregate; second, that the greater integration of international 
capital markets alters the channels through which traditional policy 
tools work-reducing  the effectiveness of quantitative controls on credit 
availability and interest rates and increasing the impact of monetary 
policy on the external sector of  the economy. At the theoretical ex- 
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bility would find it difficult to follow a monetary policy independent of 
those being followed abroad. Innovation has made the financial markets 
of all countries more open and subject to greater capital mobility. 
The first policy theme centers on the relationship between innovation 
and financial stability. Regulation of financial markets and institutions 
is intended to promote the safety and soundness of this sector of the 
economy and thereby enhance the economy’s overall allocational ef- 
ficiency.  Existing regulations  are designed to deal with a variety  of 
problems that may adversely affect economic performance. The key 
objective is to protect the integrity of  the payments system because 
this represents the lifeblood of business activity. 
Financial institutions are known to be subject to agency problems, 
as shareholders and depositors may find it difficult to monitor the be- 
havior of  bank  managers. Consequently, regulations  to constrain or 
rule out certain kinds of activities may be warranted. Financial insti- 
tutions may also be  subject to so-called insurance  or moral  hazard 
problems, whereby managers feel the incentive to take excessive risks 
(given that the federal government is insuring them) or add to their off- 
balance-sheet positions. Financial institutions might also be subject to 
conflict of interest problems if they increased their activities to include 
lending and underwriting for nonfinancial firms, as well as brokerage 
sales and trust advisory services. 
Financial innovation could clearly fuel additional fears over these 
kinds of problems. Requiring financial institutions to disclose their off- 
balance-sheet positions  would  be  an  obvious first  step. Calculating 
insurance rates and capital adequacy requirements on the basis of risk- 
adjusted  measures also  makes  sense but  might  present  operational 
difficulties. 
A related concern is whether financial innovation leads to an increase 
in  aggregate financial risk. A review of the risk attribute of the new 
financial instruments is presented in table 4.13. These include market 
risk (the risk of moment-by-moment price fluctuations), credit risk (the 
risk of  default by one counterparty in a transaction), settlement risk 
(the risk of default on the day of contract delivery or settlement), and 
liquidity risk (the risk of not being able to trade immediately). What is 
the overall impact of these new instruments on risk? 
Financial instruments that transfer price risk do not create additional 
price risk. And to the extent that a more desirable distribution of risk 
is achieved (from the standpoint of each individual), the economy may 
be  better able to withstand  certain  stressful periods.  However, the 
transfer of  risk through intermediaries creates additional linkages in 
the financial system and may raise its vulnerability to default, partic- 
ularly in a period of financial stress. In addition, as more players are 
brought into the system, to carry individualized risks associated with Table 4.W  Comparative Risks of  New Financial Market Instruments 
Instrument  Credit Risk  Market Risk  Settlement Risk  Market Liquidity Risk 
Currency options  Writer for premium 
amount until paid, buyer 
for cost of replacement 
until exercised. 
Interest rate options  Same as above. 
Currency swaps 
Interest rate swaps 
Default cancels future 
obligations. Risk limited 
to replacement cost. May 
be principal risk if agreed 
in original contract. 
Default cancels future 
obligations, risk limited 
to replacement cost. No 
principal risk. 
Limited for buyer, 
unlimited for writer. 
Same as above. 
Equal to rate 




to bond of equal 
maturity on  fixed 
side. Risk to fixed 
payer in swap  if rates 
have fallen, to fixed 
receiver if rates rise. 
Smallon  basis swap. 
No market risk on 
principal amount. 
Premium amount on 
payment date, principal 
amount for both parties if 
exercised. (One party 
pays currency A, one pays 
currency B.) 
Same as above except one 
party delivers cash, the 
other securities, if 
exercised. (Could be net 
amount if cash settled.) 
Contractual amount on 
successive payment dates. 
Interest payment amount 
only on successive 
payment dates. 
Exchange and OTC 
options new, liquidity of 
markets untested under 
stress. Liquidity of 
exchanges superior to 
OTC markets, also 
partially dependent on 
liquidity of  market for 
underlying. 
Same as above. 
All OTC contracts: 
limited liquidity. 
All OTC contracts: 
limited liquidity. Table 4.13  (continued) 
Instrument  Credit Risk  Market Risk  Settlement Risk  Market Liquidity Risk 
Note issuance facilities/ 
revolving underwriting 
facilities 
Forward rate agreements 
Eurobonds 
Floating rate notes 
Securitized credits 
Asset sales (with 
recourse) 
Asset sales (without 
recourse 
Principal amount for 
holders of paper, same 
as other guarantees for 
writers of standbys. 
Mostly cash settled, 
credit risk limited to 
amount of market risk. 
Same as onshore bond. 
Same as bond. 
Derivative from credit 
risk of underlying asset, 
sometimes with explicit 
insurance backup. 
Equal to credit risk of 
selling institution. 
Buyer takes credit risk 
of underlying debtor. 
Writers of standbys 
face risk they will 
be called on to lend 
at below-market 
spreads if market 
conditions change. 
Equal to market 
risk on deposit. 
Same as onshore 
fixed rate bond. 






Fixed by terms of 
sale. 
Set by terms of 
underlying credit 
Principal amount on 
payment date for 
borrower. 
Limited to amount of 
market risk if  cash settled 
Largely same as onshore 
market. 
Largely same as onshore 
market. 
Generally equal to similar 
conventional instruments, 





Liquidity of paper largely 
untested. 
Small market, limited 
liquidity. 
Markets well developed, 
but secondary market 
less developed than 
major onshore markets. 
Relatively new market, 
liquidity untested, thin 
secondary market. 
Markets well developed 
for long-standing 
instruments, less clear 
for new instruments. 
Thin secondary markets. 
Limited liquidity. 
Limited liquidity. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Recent Innovations in International Banking, 1986. 251  Financial Innovations in International Financial Markets 
unbundled  securities, more players need to make credit and pricing 
assessments.  And  there is no established track record  to guide the 
market for making these assessments.  Innovations may increase the 
availability of debt financing in the economy, raising the aggregate debt 
level and making it more vulnerable to shocks. 
Another line of argument concerns the behavior of financial markets 
and unbridled competitive behavior. It is often argued that asset prices 
move quickly, and they may, in the short run, overshoot their long- 
run equilibrium value. If new financial instruments are subject to this 
sort of price behavior, a considerable risk could be added to the econ- 
omy. Related to this concern is the possibility of excessive competition 
or excessive risk taking within financial institutions, perhaps related 
to the belief that behavior in these institutions may be guided by perv- 
erse incentives (e.g., compensation related to the volume of new busi- 
ness regardless of its risk). These concerns are enhanced because many 
of  the new financial instruments lead to off-balance-sheet  exposures 
that may or may not be adequately captured by existing accounting 
conventions and regulatory guidelines. 
Dealing with the above concerns is possible, but obviously easier 
said than done. The general point is that a market system, to the extent 
that information is made available, has many built-in checks and bal- 
ances that govern the behavior of market participants.  To  work in a 
stable and orderly manner, market participants need to make effective 
use of market information for decision making and performance eval- 
uation.  Market  information implies accounting systems  based  on a 
continuous revaluation or “marking to market” of all financial positions 
(whether on the balance  sheet or off) and assessment of risks on a 
portfolio basis. It may be that utilization of new financial instruments 
(interest rate swaps, for example) has actually lowered the exposure 
of  their portfolio positions to interest rate risk, thereby reducing their 
capital needs. 
Concern about mispricing of new financial instruments  seems ex- 
aggerated, since it  calls  into question the ability of  banks to make 
pricing and credit assessments of  “traditional”  instruments. The new 
instruments require an assessment of liquidity risks, traditionally rep- 
resented by the bid-ask spread, and default risks, which until recently 
were the normal task of bank lending (credit) officers. 
Excessive competition may be a concern associated with a new set 
of financial products, a scramble for an early dominant market position, 
and the inevitable  shakeout.  However, some observers have argued 
that regulatory ground rules (e.g., constant premium deposit insurance 
and historical cost accounting systems) build in incentives for managers 
to engage in excessive risk taking. A market-based regulatory system 
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ital adequacy requirements could  put  a natural brake  on excessive 
behavior. 
Given the mobility of capital, any regulatory response to financial 
innovation would need to be coordinated among national regulatory 
bodies. Otherwise, the markets will continue to engage in a kind of 
“regulatory arbitrage,” seeking the lowest level of constraints in which 
to operate. National regulatory bodies may add to this problem if they 
compete with each other in terms of regulatory laxity in order to protect 
the market share of  their domestic financial institutions. The recent 
accord between U.S. and British bank regulatory authorities announc- 
ing risk-based capital adequacy standards within a highly similar set 
of rules is a welcome first step toward international coordination (see 
Nash 1987, 1). 
The second, and final, policy theme concerns the impact of financial 
innovation on domestic monetary policy. Financial innovation has low- 
ered  transaction  costs, increased the menu  of  available assets,  and 
increased the ease of substitution among assets. As a result, the ability 
of  authorities to measure and control the money supply has been re- 
duced. Individuals and firms also have increased their access to vari- 
able-rate financing and numerous risk-hedging instruments. The avail- 
ability of variable-rate financing may reduce the sting of contractionary 
monetary policy because borrowers still have access to funds for which 
they may be willing temporarily to pay a higher rate. Lenders receive 
higher-interest  income during these periods, which tends to increase 
aggregate spending. 
The greater concern is that because of the increasing international 
mobility of capital, the dominant channel through which monetary pol- 
icy is now felt may be the exchange rate.  If  countries are unable to 
coordinate their monetary policies effectively, then large exchange rate 
swings are more likely to develop. Countries then run the danger that 
protectionist pressures will mount, producing a contraction in inter- 
national trade and reducing the gains from trade. 
4.7  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has offered an overview of some of the financial market 
innovations we have seen over the last few years, the causes of in- 
novation, and the implications of both in terms of economic effects 
and policy responses. The incentives for financial innovation are strong 
and at the foundation of a market system. Self-interest, profit max- 
imization, risk optimization, and technological change are guiding the 
process. Benefits clearly accrue to those directly involved in the in- 
novating and trading process. Natural barriers that segment world cap- 
ital markets are under pressure, resulting in a tendency toward greater 
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The transition from a segmented international capital market to one 
that is  more  integrated  will  also impose  some costs. There will  be 
greater demands for information and measures of the risk and return 
of the new financial instruments. Policy-related barriers (taxes, regu- 
lations, and so forth) will also lose some of their force, and to the extent 
that these were used for prudential control, other policies will have to 
take their place. The need to coordinate regulatory  policies will in- 
crease. Monetary policy is more likely to effect the external sector of 
the economy  via exchange rates, potentially  raising the demand for 
trade protection. This prospect heightens the need for macroeconomic 
policy coordination. 
In a potential sense, the world economy stands to benefit from the 
financial innovative process. But the process is not without its risks 
and not without increasing demands for policy coordination. 
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1. Assessments  of  the recent experience have  been prepared by  Bank  of 
England  1983; OECD 1984; and Germany and Morton 1985. By far the most 
comprehensive report describing recent innovations and their possible welfare 
and policy implications is that of the study group of the Group of Ten Countries 
(referred to in this paper as the G-10 report) published by the Bank for Inter- 
national Settlements in April 1986. 
2. An interesting and potentially highly important area of financial innovation 
is that dealing,with the European currency unit (ECU). Since the introduction 
of the European Monetary System in March 1979, the ECU has been propelled 
to greater importance as a legal parallel currency for transactions throughout 
most of Europe. An array of innovative ECU products (e.g., ECU-denominated 
deposits, loans, swaps, bonds, futures, options, and numerous variations on 
these themes), applications (e.g., ECU invoicing), and institutions  (e.g., the 
Mutual  ECU Settlement  Association for clearing transactions)  have quickly 
developed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these developments 
in detail. The reader is referred to Levich  1987a and 1987b; Levich and Som- 
mariva  1987; and the references cited therein for further discussion. 
3.  Informal estimates of the volume of foreign exchange trading in various 
centers are reported in Group of Thirty 1985, 11. 
4. The bank, Banque Commerciale pour I’Europe du Nord, carried the cable 
address EUROBANK, which later became synonymous with the general ac- 
tivity of accepting deposits offshore. See Kvasnicka 1969. 
5. For a further description of International Banking Facilities, see Chrystal 
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6. When asked whether the impact  of  Chicago’s  futures markets on the 
underlying asset markets was not  an example  of  the tail  wagging the dog, 
Richard Sandor replied that the questioner was mistaken-“the  dog had moved 
to Chicago” (Proceedings of the Conference on Hedging with Financial Futures 
for Institutional Investors, Salomon Brothers Center, New York University). 
7. More complex strategies are possible. For example, a corporation seeking 
five-year funds might borrow for ten years and sell the final five years’ proceeds 
forward. 
8. Gaz de France represents an interesting case study. Between  1983 and 
1985 the company entered into 102 swap transactions totaling $7.4 billion to 
completely transform the currency profile of their financing away from U.S. 
dollars and toward European currencies, including the ECU. See Reboul 1987 
for details. 
9. See Miller 1977 for a discussion of the use of securities markets for tax 
shifting. 
10.  A  thorough discussion of  foreign exchange option pricing  and market 
characteristics is presented in Grabbe 1986, chap. 6. 
11. For example, a forward contract might be split into the combination of 
a put-and-call option. A U.S. Treasury security might be split into its principal 
and interest components. 
12. Figlewski 1986 presents a thorough analysis of the use of financial futures 
for hedging portfolios of money market instruments. 
13. For further details, see First Boston  1986, 218-22. 
14. See Giddy and Hekman 1984 for a formal demonstration. 
15. For further details, see Bock  1983. 
16. The cost is approximate because we ignore (i) interest  compounding, 
(ii) selling U.S. commercial paper for same-day delivery while foreign exchange 
quotations  are sold for two-day  delivery,  and (iii) transactions costs in the 
commercial paper program  and forward  contracts.  See Kreiner  1986 for a 
thorough analysis of these costs. 
17. Alternative approaches for computing the cost of a long-term forward 
contract are reviewed in Ant1 1983. 
18. A good example are the so-called bull and bear bonds, which are Eu- 
robonds with payoffs index-linked to the performance of the West German or 
Japanese stock markets. These instruments are a close substitute for actual 
stock index options on these markets that are currently  outlawed.  National 
regulators  could  attempt to impose  sanctions on buyers or  sellers of  these 
offshore securities, but this form of control is untested. 
19. Futures  contracts were  traded on over  128 products during  the last 
century. Recently, only 45 commodities were actively traded on futures mar- 
kets, including just 8 of the 23 commodities traded in 1929. See Black 1986 for 
a model of  success and failure of futures contracts based on commodity and 
contract characteristics. 
20.  Classic definitions  of  perfect  capital markets (for example, Fama and 
Miller  1972, 20-22)  often begin with  the case of  certainty.  In the certainty 
case, all individuals necessarily share the same information and expectations. 
Individuals still require financial markets under certainty to smooth their life- 
time consumption to its desired path. 
21.  For  a formal  proof,  see Cox  and Rubinstein  1985, chap. 8, and the 
references cited therein. 
22.  A barrier that applies more in the case of international capital markets 
is the absence of a clear mechanism for enforcing legal contracts across borders. 255  Financial Innovations in International  Financial Markets 
The possibility of debt repudiation may be a significant factor leading to  reduced 
international capital flows and the existence of apparent arbitrage profits. Du- 
mas 1986 argues that financial service firms may be in a position to bridge this 
gap.  Unlike the occasional  borrower, the penalty  for repudiation  would  be 
high; a major financial firm cannot afford  to lose its reputation and so the 
chance of repudiation on their part is slim. In this way, financial services firms 
substitute for the nonexistence of a contract enforcement mechanism. 
23.  Black’s  (1986) model  incorporates this  result, predicting  that futures 
contracts are more likely to be successful in the marketplace if  they increase 
the ability  of  people  to hedge  their risks  (i.e., if  they  increase the hedging 
effectiveness offered in the market). The presence of  transaction costs might 
increase the number of useful hedging vehicles. For example, even if  options 
contracts were traded on all five hundred securities of the Standard and Poor’s 
500 index, an S&P 500 index option would  still be a cheaper way to take a 
position on all securities simultaneously. 
24. The International  Swap Dealers Associations  (1986) has promulgated a 
code intended to standardize and simplify swap documentation.  Parties to a 
swap agreement  may  adopt the code in its entirety or selectively.  Express 
provisions in a swap contract always override anything to the contrary in the 
code. 
25.  Other formal linkages exist between the New  York Commodities Ex- 
change (COMEX) and the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE), the Chicago Board 
of  Trade (CBT) and the London International  Financial  Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE), and the SFE  and LIFFE. The National Association of Security Deal- 
ers and the London Stock Exchange  are conducting a pilot  project  for the 
exchange of stock price quotations, also aimed at expanding international trad- 
ing opportunities. 
26.  Somewhat contrary evidence  comes from the United  States Treasury 
issues targeted to the Eurobond market. These data suggest that targeted Euro- 
U.S. Treasuries yield about thirty basis points less than comparable Treasury 
issues in the United States. By implication, the Treasury could increase the 
supply of offerings in the Eurobond market before interest rates would equalize 
with onshore Treasury issues. 
27. See, for example, Aliber 1973, and Frenkel and Levich  1975. 
28. See Dooley and hard 1980, and Frenkel and Levich 1981. 
29. Feldman’s analysis on this point leaves some ambiguity. He discusses 
the interest rate parity relationship as the criterion for market integration, but 
then uses the expected rate of  exchange rate change rather than the forward 
premium in his formulation. 
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2. E. Gerald Corrigan 
The Worldwide Implications of 
Financial Innovations 
The subject of international financial innovation is obviously vast in scope, 
and it is only recently that we are seeing systematic efforts to categorize 
and analyze the many changes that are occurring in the character and op- 
eration of  our international money and capital markets. Those efforts 
reached something of a watershed last spring with the publication by the 
Bank for International Settlements of the so-called Cross report, Recent 
Innovations  in InternationalBanking. But the cause ofbetter  analysis and 
understanding is now being advanced on many fronts. 258  Richard M. Levich/E. Gerald  ComganlCharles  S. SanfordlGeorge  J. Votja 
Because so much  of  a  descriptive nature on this  subject is now 
available, I forgo the usually lengthy discussion of trends and devel- 
opments in  order to focus my  remarks on some of the policy impli- 
cations of the process of international financial innovation. However, 
as a starting point I want to briefly stress several aspects of the situation 
which seem to me essential to the evolution of our thinking. 
First, the process of  financial innovation  has and will  continue to 
provide important benefits to suppliers and users of financial services 
and to the  larger goal of  seeking to insure that the world’s  capital 
resources are allocated in the most efficient manner possible. However, 
even under the best  of  circumstances, there are bound  to be some 
bumps along the road as new techniques, new instruments, and new 
systems are put to the test of the marketplace. 
Second, while many of the new financial practices and instruments 
we are seeing gained popularity as devices to protect against unforeseen 
changes in credit, interest rate, or exchange rate conditions, they can, 
themselves, be the source of  new and sometimes subtle elements of 
risk.  At  the  very  least, we  know  that  none of  these  practices  can 
eliminate risk; they can and do redistribute it, but even then it is unclear 
whether that process of  redistribution works to heighten or to reduce 
risks to the system as a whole. 
Third, many of today’s financial transactions are very complex and 
may not always be fully understood by the principals to such trans- 
actions. Indeed, in some cases it is not so easy to distinguish principals 
from agents, a distinction that becomes vital in the face of adversity. 
Fourth, looking at the financial system on a worldwide basis, there 
can be no doubt that innovation has increased the extent of operational, 
liquidity, and credit interdependencies among major markets and major 
institutions. In this sense, we should all be operating on the assumption 
that systemic risk probably has increased, even though some would 
debate that point of view. 
Finally, we must be sensitive to the fact that much of what we call 
financial innovation has taken place in the post-1982 environment of 
expanding economies and declining interest rates.  We  all know that 
neither the business cycle nor the interest rate cycle is dead. 
With these general observations in mind, all of  us, I believe, can 
agree that the process of international financial innovation is raising a 
host of public policy questions ranging from the structure of our money 
and capital markets-including  the structure and workings of the official 
“safety net” associated with those markets-to  the workings of mon- 
etary policy in a much more financially integrated world. In addition, 
I believe we can also all agree that whatever else these forces may 
imply, they certainly imply that we must have a higher degree of in- 259  Financial Innovations in International Financial Markets 
ternational policy coordination, not just in regard to macroeconomic 
policy but  also with regard  to supervisory and related policies  and 
practices bearing on activities of financial institutions and markets. 
In some circles, the call for greater international policy coordination 
is greeted with sentiments ranging from doubt to outright skepticism 
as to whether the requisite degree of coordination is achievable. While 
the problems are formidable, international economic and financial pol- 
icy coordination is working better than is often recognized.  Several 
examples lead me to that conclusion. 
First, the G-5, G-7 process has clearly led to a much higher degree 
of mutual understanding of problems and prospects while at the same 
time yielding important steps in policy coordination. That is not to say 
that all of the problems have been solved; clearly, they have not. How- 
ever, progress has been made, and important building blocks for the 
future are in place. Having said that, I should also stress that the case 
for greater cooperation in the policy process does not mean that nec- 
essary policy initiatives of a unilateral nature can be ignored. To the 
contrary, policy coordination can only be fruitful to the extent that the 
individual countries are following broadly sensible policies in the first 
instance. Indeed, absent those fundamentals and the willingness to act 
unilaterally when needed, there is the obvious danger that policy co- 
ordination could become the coordination of bad policies. 
Second, today’s evident problems notwithstanding, I would also ar- 
gue that the efforts to deal with the LDC debt problem over the past 
five years are a truly remarkable example of international cooperation 
among an incredibly large group of participants,  public and private. 
Having said that, I am obviously sensitive to the fact that the process 
is under renewed  strain as highlighted by Brazil’s current difficulties 
and the greater difficulties in obtaining broad-based commercial bank 
support for and participation in restructuring and fresh money-lending 
programs. Clearly, these sources of strain must be overcome or we run 
the risk of reversing the hard-won gains of the past-a  result that can 
only mean greater risks, greater instability, and greater tensions for all. 
Third, in the area of bank  supervision, there is also clear and im- 
portant evidence of cooperation and coordination. The latest and per- 
haps most graphic example is the  joint effort by authorities in the United 
States and the United Kingdom to promulgate comparable risk-based 
capital adequacy standards for internationally active banks in our re- 
spective countries. I regard that initiative as a genuine breakthrough 
in international cooperation, in part because we were able to agree on 
such a complex and technical subject, but also because the approach- 
as it applies to balance sheet and off-balance-sheet activities-is  the 
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adapt basic supervisory standards to the wide range of the new activ- 
ities and new instruments that have grown out of the process of financial 
innovation. 
Finally, I cite another, more subtle, example of  international coop- 
eration: the monthly meeting of the central bank governors in  Basle. 
The value of these meetings stems not merely from the fact that they 
provide a regular and recurring vehicle for discussion of timely issues 
of mutual concern but also because the central bank governors and 
their key staff personnel have come to know each other so well. The 
spirit of  collegiality and trust growing out of  the Basle meetings can 
be of  considerable value in dealing with problems when they arise. 
In citing these several examples of progress being made in the area 
of increased policy coordination, I do not want to leave the impression 
that any of  us can be sanguine about the future. To the contrary, the 
agenda for the future is formidable. Therefore, I will touch on some 
of  the areas that seem to me of particular importance, first in regard 
to the operation and supervision of financial institutions and markets 
and then in regard to monetary policy itself. 
In banking and finance, the first order of business starts here at home 
and relates to our capacity as a nation to come up with a coherent point 
of view concerning what our banking and financial system should look 
like. That vision must take account not only of market and competitive 
realities  here  and around the  world, but  also of  the public  interest 
considerations associated with the stability, integrity, and public con- 
fidence in the operation of  the system. Those public interest consid- 
erations, among other things, mean that  the system must be  strong 
enough to withstand the failure of those who abuse it, even when they 
are large in size. Indeed, the marketplace cannot live up to its promise 
of efficiency and order if  even a few market participants believe that 
the public safety net will protect not just the system as a whole, but 
all participants, including those who have acted in an undisciplined or 
irresponsible fashion. We  simply cannot have a system that combines 
the maximization of profits with the socialization of losses. 
While the need to reshape the basic legislative and supervisory frame- 
work surrounding our banking and financial markets and institutions 
has been recognized for some time, today’s international market real- 
ities make that case all the more compelling. As most of you know, I 
have recently suggested one longer-term view of what our banking and 
financial system ought to look like. In making that essay available, I 
hoped it would serve as a vehicle to help shape the debate-including 
its public policy elements-while  at the same time providing, to use 
the comptroller of the currency’s words, something of a script others 
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in that regard, but one thing is clear; namely, the case for fundamental 
reform is overwhelming and will not go away, nor will the need for 
some immediate legislative initiatives along the lines that have been 
persistently  and aggressively espoused  by  the Federal Reserve  and 
others. 
Coming to grips with the structure of our own banking and financial 
system is, among other things, an indispensable prerequisite to coming 
to better grips with the structure of  the supervisory system both do- 
mestically and internationally. Indeed, it strikes me as sheer folly to 
assume that we can better rationalize the structure of the banking and 
financial supervisory apparatus here in the United  States while the 
system itself is in such a state of flux. However, and without prejudging 
what, if anything, should be done with it, it is clear that supervisory 
practices must, here and abroad, adjust to the new environment. For 
example, building on the U.S.-U.K. initiative, I hope that other major 
countries-especially  those with large and active markets and insti- 
tutions-will  quickly begin the process of  bringing capital standards 
for internationally active banking organizations into greater conformity 
with emerging international standards. To put it directly, the compet- 
itive and prudential  implications of  major banking organizations op- 
erating around the world with distinctly different capital requirements 
are simply not  in  the  best  long-run interests of  strong,  stable, and 
appropriately competitive international banking markets. 
While internationally harmonious bank capital standards are impor- 
tant, they are only part of the task that lies ahead. Let me, therefore, 
briefly cite four other areas that I believe will require attention in the 
period ahead: 
First, many of these issues that  arise in the context of efforts to 
achieve a greater degree of harmony internationally in banking markets 
also arise in other areas. For example, a case can be made that greater 
convergence in securities market regulations among countries is a nec- 
essary corollary to greater harmony on the banking side. The case for 
greater convergence can also be made in regard to specific markets 
such as foreign exchange and swaps where banks and securities com- 
panies compete directly. 
Second, the international payments system requires, in my judgment, 
continued attention with a view toward doing all we reasonably can to 
ensure its reliability and stability. This may be especially true for the 
vast flows of payments denominated in U.S. dollars, many of which 
are interbank in nature and almost all of  which are associated with 
financial transactions. These dollar-denominated payments-many  of 
which originate in  London, Tokyo, and elsewhere and flash through 
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day. As such, they entail operational, liquidity, and credit interdepen- 
dencies of very sizable proportions among virtually all the major bank- 
ing organizations in the world. 
Numerous efforts are underway within the Federal Reserve and within 
and among private banlung organizations-foreign  and domestic-aimed 
at strengthening credit and operational characteristics  of these pay- 
ments systems. However, these efforts take time, and as time passes 
the volume of transactions continues to grow very rapidly. In these 
circumstances, it important that parent organizations of foreign branches 
and affiliates with major operations in the United  States, as well as 
their central banks, take steps to ensure they understand the risks that 
can be associated with international payments flows, including, but by 
no means limited to, dollar payments that are settled in New York. 
Third, fresh questions are arising concerning the powers and privi- 
leges granted to financial institutions operating on foreign soil. We  in 
the United  States have for some years followed a policy of  national 
treatment whereby foreign banks and securities firms operating in the 
United States have the same privileges and responsibilities as do our 
domestic institutions. Others follow that same policy, but in some coun- 
tries reciprocity,  or a blend of reciprocity and national treatment, is 
the rule. However, even where national treatment is the policy, ques- 
tions arise as to whether practices  are always consistent  with that 
policy. 
The policy of national treatment is coming under attack in the United 
States amid perceptions that U.S. firms are not always treated even- 
handedly in some other countries. This situation requires our careful 
attention since protectionism  in  banking and finance is susceptible to 
those same insidious forces that we all fear on the trade side; in short, 
once unleashed, it is difficult to know where it will stop. 
Fourth, there  is a host  of  questions regarding the implications of 
efforts underway in a number of countries to reshape the basic legis- 
lative and regulatory framework within which banking and financial 
institutions operate, in the face of the changes that have been induced 
by market forces over the past decade or more. In addition to difficult 
issues of legal and regulatory philosophy, custom, and tradition, these 
efforts must also come to grips with differences in data reporting and 
consolidation requirements, tax policies, disclosure rules, and account- 
ing standards. 
As I said earlier, the agenda regarding the structure and supervision 
of  banking and financial markets is formidable indeed, but there are 
also a number of important questions regarding monetary policy that 
grow out of  the process of international financial innovation. For ex- 
ample, we know that at least for a transition period, financial innovation 
has played a role in undercutting relationships between monetary ag- 263  Financial Innovations in International Financial Markets 
gregates and key macroeconomic variables such as the GNP or the 
price level. We also know that the exchange rate is now more important 
than it  once was insofar as its role in  transmitting  monetary policy 
changes to the economy. We  also know that a variety of forces asso- 
ciated with the process of financial innovation implies that the role of 
credit-rationing devices in the monetary policy process has been re- 
duced in importance, while price variables-interest  rates and the ex- 
change rate-have  become more important. Finally, while we cannot 
be sure, many strongly suspect that the lags in the monetary policy 
process have become either longer or more unpredictable, or both. 
In combination, these forces imply that the monetary policy process 
is subject to new sources of uncertainty and new tensions. This seems 
to me to imply that judgment and discretion will have to continue to 
play a large role in the process of monetary policy formulation and 
execution. I say this not just because there are the obvious questions 
surrounding the relevance of outdated empirical analysis and related 
“rules of thumb” concerning the workings of monetary policy, but also 
because the unbundling of the credit apparatus raises important ques- 
tions as to the incidence of  monetary restraint, not just its ultimate 
impact on the economy at large. 
As I said earlier, it is clear that the international side of the monetary 
policy equation will be more important than it once was. That, in turn, 
implies the need for still greater communication and coordination, but 
the case for greater coordination internationally must not divert our 
attention from pressing matters here at home. Among the clear prior- 
ities in that regard are the need to better rationalize and strengthen our 
banking and financial system, and the need to reduce significantly and 
decisively the budget deficit, thereby narrowing and ultimately elimi- 
nating the domestic savings gap and thus providing the financial room 
to reduce our external deficits. Finally, financial institutions and finan- 
cial market practitioners are going to have to gain a renewed sense of 
self-discipline and prior restraint if we are to avoid running the world’s 
credit system too close to the soft shoulder of the high-speed express- 
way of international finance. None of  these challenges will be easy to 
overcome, but if we are to reap the fullest benefits of financial inno- 
vation we must find the ways. I, for one, believe we can. 264  Richard M. Levich/E. Gerald ComganlCharJes S. SanfordGeorge 1. Vojta 
3. Charles S. Sanford, Jr., 
and George J. Vojta 
Deregulation, Technology, and the “Safety and 
Soundness” of the Financial System 
Incomplete deregulation of the financial services industry and the dra- 
matic advances in information technology are seriously damaging the 
safety and soundness of  the commercial banking and thrift franchises 
in the United States, while at the same time creating a highly concen- 
trated and protected securities industry. 
The magnitude and pace of these powerful and irreversible changes 
are so great that the ability of adversely affected intermediaries  and 
their responsible regulators to adapt is being severely tested. The result 
is progressive,  increasing danger to the safety and  soundness of the 
American financial system. The derivative  consequence  is that financial 
competition  and innovation which improve service to the public are 
arrested because of accelerating  systemic risk. Let us examine these 
issues one by one. 
Incomplete Deregulation 
During the Great Depression, interest rates on deposits were fixed 
by law or regulation at zero or relatively low levels, entry to banking 
was restricted, local banking markets were protected by limits to geo- 
graphic expansion, federal insurance was provided for deposits, and 
banks gained exclusive access to the lender-of-last-resort  window of 
the Federal Reserve system. At the same time, banks relinquished the 
right  to underwrite  securities. It was a package deal. The result was 
that commercial banks had the lowest cost of funds. Since they could 
charge less and yet maintain a decent profit, they had the pick of  the 
most creditworthy and liquid assets. Banks became AAA “gilt-edged” 
credits, and few if any of them needed FDIC support to attract or hold 
deposits. 
Today, the pact has been abrogated. The deregulation of the liability 
side of commercial banks’ balance sheet, which occurred in the 1970s 
and  1980s, left the banks with a much higher relative  cost of funds. 
Today the most creditworthy banks are unable to fund profitably, even 
on an acceptable mismatch  basis, a loan to an A- or better-rated in- 
dustrial company. As a result, the quality of the bank loan portfolios 
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has deteriorated and bank credit ratings have degraded  significantly. 
Many banks now must have FDIC support to keep or attract funds. 
This process, far from being static, continues in a downward spiral. 
Such an unpromising  situation would  not  exist if, at  the time  of 
deposit deregulation, banks had  been  allowed to service the  better 
credits in the open markets. The anomalies in the present situation are 
astonishing. A bank is not permitted to hold a liquid credit for five 
minutes, but is allowed to hold the same credit as an illiquid investment 
for fifty years. Banks cannot underwrite commercial paper, but they 
can underwrite the backup line of credit that comes into play when the 
credit behind commercial paper deteriorates. 
One alternative is to return to the  1930s arrangement, which guar- 
anteed banks the lowest cost of funds, an option that even the most 
politically naive agree is impossible. Granting that premise, elimination 
of Glass-Steagall is the only rational cure for the decline of the safety 
and soundness of the banking business which has resulted from incom- 
plete deregulation. 
Foreign banks have been more fortunate. The advance of deregu- 
lation abroad seems inexorable. The British Big Bang and the changes 
taking place in  Canada, to cite only recent  events, are not isolated 
developments. At the  same time, we  see Swiss and German banks 
underwriting corporate bonds and stocks in the U.S. market. All of 
this is part of a global movement toward free competition in the financial 
markets. We  hope that the completion of deregulation in the United 
States will follow soon. 
Richard Levich’s paper outlines clearly, with strong documentation, 
the broad  picture.  There is no  need  to refine his  discussion of  the 
process by which banks have lost ground to open market alternatives 
and seen their creditworthiness deteriorate. There is no escaping the 
conclusion  that half  of  the Glass-Steagall arrangement has been  re- 
pealed but the other half remains. U.S. banks are no longer protected 
from competition, but their powers to compete remain restricted. 
Information Technology 
The costs of gathering, storing, analyzing, and globally transmitting 
information have fallen dramatically. No end to this trend is in sight. 
The existence of financial intermediaries depends upon deficiencies in 
the information flow between borrowers and investors. 
Information is not free and is not equally distributed across the pop- 
ulation. It takes time and effort to find a counterparty to a bargain, 
and a suitable counterparty with complementary financial needs may 
be hard to find or may be nonexistent. Bargains cost money to structure 
and to enforce. Crafting a deal properly to reflect real-world legal, tax, 
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an expert on everything, so it pays to specialize-some  of us build cars 
and some of us underwrite bonds. Some people are smarter than others; 
some people work harder than others; and some people are more willing 
to take risks than others. 
Last, but certainly not least, governments may muddle up the works 
by supplanting the judgment of the market with the judgment of poli- 
ticians. They do so sometimes in the name of high-minded goals like 
fairness, equality, and political stability, and sometimes in the service 
of special interests or entrenched mythologies,  as in the case of  the 
Glass-Steagall Act. 
These shortcomings are what the economist likes to call  “market 
imperfections,” a term that may not do them justice. These imperfec- 
tions cost society money by creating blockages and distortions in  the 
flow of funds from investors to borrowers. Faulty investment decisions 
make society poorer than it would otherwise be. 
The financial intermediary is a specialist whose job is to eliminate, 
circumvent, or reduce the cost of these financial market imperfections. 
The earnings of intermediaries depend upon the magnitude of the mar- 
ket imperfections  that they face and their success in getting around 
them-whether  by providing efficient information processing, by pro- 
viding expert judgment, or by bearing unwanted risks. Improvements 
in information technology make it easier and cheaper to  overcome those 
market  imperfections  that are caused by  deficiencies in  the flow of 
information between  borrowers and investors. As these deficiencies 
are remedied by better and cheaper information technology, the demand 
for intermediation falls, increasing the competitive pressure on  financial 
firms. 
An important example of this phenomenon is the disappearance of 
the commercial banks’ virtual monopoly on credit information. Years 
ago, banks gathered and evaluated information about the financial health 
of potential borrowers-a  difficult and, in most cases, impossible if not 
prohibitively  expensive task for individual investors. A bank pooled 
depositors’ funds and lent to borrowers it determined were the best 
credit risks. Borrowers had few alternatives to the low-cost funds pro- 
vided by banks. 
Information technology has reduced the banks’ comparative advan- 
tage in evaluating and taking credit risks. Computer  and communication 
technology can quickly distribute financial news and data to  the market 
in general. Rating agencies specialize in selling credit analysis on grow- 
ing number of borrowers to a wider and wider audience. SEC disclosure 
requirements greatly improve the quantity and quality of  available in- 
formation. Banks have lost their relative monopoly in credit informa- 
tion; instead  credit information  is becoming a utility  outside of the 
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Computer technology  has  also increased the efficiency of  pooled 
investing via mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional and 
individual investors.  Investable funds are concentrated increasingly 
with these institutional and affluent individual investors, who are willing 
and able to do their own research and analysis. Investors now buy 
securities of the issuers directly, bypassing the bank loan and inter- 
mediation process.  Since this disintermediation of banks begins with 
the better credits and works its way down, banks not only suffer a loss 
in business volume; they  suffer a loss in the quality of  the business 
that is left to them.  As the competition for lesser credit increases, 
margins correspondingly decline. Thus, because of advances in infor- 
mation technology, and also because of incomplete deregulation, the 
bank  loan and deposit business  is under  intense  attack from  more 
efficient, open markets  and  bank  asset quality is  deteriorating.  But 
technology  is transforming  the nature  of  financial intermediaries as 
well. 
It is hard to say whether intermediaries, as a group, will make more 
or less money as technology advances. What is clear is that successful 
financial firms will be structured and managed very differently from 
today. For example, as technology makes routine information cheaper 
and more widely available, financial professionals will have to find new 
ways to add value for their customers.  More than a few of  today’s 
securities salespeople earn a handsome living by reciting current market 
prices,  repeating  conventional market  chat, and  helping customers 
evaluate simple trades. What happens when most of their customers 
have screens and expert systems to give the real-time prices and instant 
analysis of common trades? 
As another example, artificial intelligence may make computer-to- 
computer trading a practical possibility. The more routine trades for 
the high-volume standardized instruments might be the first to be au- 
tomated. Just as today’s bond trader uses a programmed calculator, 
which is nothing more than an expert system, to do bond math and to 
evaluate simple trades, tomorrow’s trading manager might use an au- 
tomated trader to execute part of  the firm’s overall trading strategy. 
One early form of programmed trading is already achieving notoriety 
in the equities markets. The message is that the lower-order skills that 
are now the stock-in-trade of many traders, salespeople, loan officers, 
and other financial people are being taken over by  technology  and 
artificial intelligence of one form or another, leaving the higher-order 
skills to be performed by a new breed of financial professionals. 
This new breed  combines the talents of  an artist with those of  a 
technician and has enormous ability to craft creative solutions to cus- 
tomer-specific financial problems. This new person is comfortable with 
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to function. Information technology is no longer a black box  in the 
back office but a critical front office tool. As firms employ greater and 
greater numbers of these new financial people, they will undergo sig- 
nificant organizational change, since these people will have to be man- 
aged differently. There will be fewer levels of management, weaker 
hierarchy, and less bureaucracy. A high-performance atmosphere will 
require greater autonomy and collegiality among professional members 
of the firm. 
Also, the new technology will drive geographical expansion because 
the  market  is  now  global and  requires a presence  in  all  the  major 
financial centers. Once the technology has become worldwide in scope 
and available to everyone who wishes access to the marketplace, then 
its specific location becomes irrelevant. Indeed, we can expect a certain 
geographical contraction to occur as firms focus their technology in 
the country where they are headquartered. 
Information Technology and the New Global Market 
Aside from the more obvious effects of technology on financial mar- 
kets and institutions, another important structural change is occurring. 
Technology is allowing the creation of a globally integrated market for 
distinct, unbundled financial attributes. 
Any financial instrument can be thought of  as a bundle of  financial 
attributes, such as amount, term, currency, repricing interval, base rate, 
credit risk, tax benefits, and so on. The new technologies, caps, floors, 
options, futures, and so forth are used to unbundle and repackage these 
attributes. Traditionally, a financial instrument was priced by compar- 
ing it to other instruments of the same name and the same structure 
trading in the same market. Today, it is common to price an instrument 
by comparing it to pieces or packages of other types of instruments in 
many different markets, that in combination produce the same financial 
result, that is, the same bundle of financial attributes. 
For example, a U.  S. dollar floating-rate loan from a U .S. bank is not 
simply compared to other floating-rate loans  offered  by  other U.S. 
banks. It is also compared to a fixed-rate Eurodollar bond issue coupled 
with an interest rate swap and to a floating-rate sterling loan from a 
U.K. bank coupled with a currency swap. All produce the same bundle 
of attributes: funding in  a given currency for a given term that floats 
off a given base rate at a given repricing interval. 
Sophisticated borrowers and investors with ready access to the global 
markets approach financial needs by defining their underlying require- 
ment  for financial attributes-currency, term, repricing,  and so on. 
They compare alternative packages of these attributes assembled from 
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ments. Financial attributes are being priced and traded on world mar- 
kets. As the volume of this activity expands, a single world price for 
each attribute  will  emerge. None of this  would  be possible  without 
modern information technology to gather and analyze quickly data from 
all over the world. 
In due course, every financial instrument will become a potential 
competitor to every other financial instrument.  The ability to disas- 
semble  and  repackage  attributes  into  optional  bundles  means  that 
anomalies in prices of  different instruments will be arbitraged away 
more quickly. Artificial intelligence will accelerate this process by al- 
lowing the rapid comparison of many complex alternatives. 
Similarly, segmentation and isolation of markets by political or in- 
stitutional boundaries will be much harder to sustain because of com- 
petition from efficient synthetic substitutes available in the global mar- 
ket.  Borrowers  and  investors  will  benefit greatly from  this  intense 
competition.  The middleman’s profit on basic intermediation will de- 
cline as a result of these developments. More important, it will be far 
easier to diversify away or hedge unwanted risks to achieve a custom- 
ized financial position  suited to the customer’s situation. Successful 
financial professionals will be adept at using technology to help cus- 
tomers achieve their desired financial position. 
Access to this new global market will be extremely valuable. Since 
the loss of market access will be costly, perhaps fatal, everyone will 
be subject to increased market discipline. It will be necessary to dis- 
close all important information and, indeed, secrets will be much harder 
to keep. Failure to honor agreements may be suicidal. 
The impact on financial intermediaries will be dramatic. Comfortable 
and profitable niches that are now protected by tradition, insulation, 
and regulation will be under relentless attack. The successful inter- 
mediary will not make its money from passive risk bearing or milking 
customers who have nowhere else to go. Instead, profit will be earned 
from (1) the creation and professional execution of effective solutions 
to unique financial problems; (2) the astute trading and positioning of 
financial attributes; and (3) the low-cost production and distribution of 
standard financial attributes in high volumes. 
Relatively few firms will be capable of meeting the necessary stan- 
dards of  excellence over a wide range of  customers and products. It 
will be vital to focus resources on a clearly defined and sustainable 
business franchise that is built upon a firm’s unique strengths. 
The advance of information technology will not be reversed unless 
some calamity returns the world to the Stone Age. Politicians may 
cause temporary  setbacks, but technology  will  advance inexorably. 
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technology will merely transfer their wealth to others who are more 
enlightened. Even the Kremlin cannot stop the PC from undermining 
its centralized monopoly on information. 
How do regulators achieve safety and soundness in  this new envi- 
ronment? They must create a financial system that responds to the 
challenges of  technology and avoids stifling, harmful over-regulation. 
In these circumstances, over-regulation and restrictions on competition 
will  create another perilous  spiral. Suffocating regulation will breed 
evasive and desperate risk taking, which in turn will breed costly in- 
stitutional failures, thus inviting further regulation, starting the cycle 
all over again. Reregulation in the United States runs the risk of gen- 
erating such a process. We support three major changes in public policy 
with respect to the financial system: (1) reform of the “safety net”; 
(2)  deposit insurance reform; and  (3) removal of arbitrary restriction 
on product powers. 
Reform of the “Safety Net” 
When healthy market discipline and free competition  are compro- 
mised by stifling regulation and an ambiguous “safety net,”  banks are 
denied the means and the incentives  to build  sound and sustainable 
businesses. There are many important roles for regulators to play, but 
it is unrealistic to pretend that they can be solely responsible for the 
health of individual banks and the system as a whole. 
The erroneous assumption is that the safety of  the financial system 
is synonymous with  the safety of individual banking institutions.  In 
this view,  to protect the system, the government must restrain  and 
protect each bank in hope of minimizing the number and severity of 
bank failures. A more promising approach is to return to the original 
purpose of the “safety net”-to  protect small depositors and the system 
at large without protecting or guaranteeing the survival of individual 
institutions. 
Protecting individual institutions is an expensive and self-defeating 
policy. Ultimately, it will be ineffective, for it 
breeds incompetent or reckless managers; 
places superhuman demands on regulators to prevent or salvage fail- 
ures and forces them to say no to anything perceived to be “risky” 
or unfamiliar in terms of broadened competitive powers; 
creates excess capacity in the industry by preventing the exit of unfit 
and unneeded firms; and 
risks catastrophic losses to the insurance funds by encouraging in- 
solvent firms to go for broke at the public’s expense (the FSLIC has 
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Gearing regulatory policy to try to prevent individual bank failures 
is at variance with providing a safe and sound financial system. We 
should focus instead on insulating the system from any serious con- 
sequences of  bank failures rather than preventing individual failures 
themselves. It is possible to insure that the failure of one bank or group 
of banks will not spread to otherwise healthy banks in a contagion of 
failure that threatens the system as a whole. 
In the absence of adequate safeguards, there is no denying that such 
an event could take place, given banks’ illiquid assets, short liabilities, 
and interlocking transactions. There are safeguards in place now, how- 
ever, and more could be added if necessary. Existing safeguards include 
banks’ limits on credit extended to any one bank, daylight overdraft 
limits on Fedwire and CHIPS, and the ability of the Federal Reserve 
to lend  to solvent but temporarily  illiquid institutions.  The deposit 
insurance system effectively precludes runs on retail deposits. 
Technical changes in payment system procedures and policies might 
further reduce  the risk  of  contagion.  (Note that there is no risk  of 
contagion on Fedwire now, since the Federal Reserve guarantees pay- 
ments when made. The issue here is credit risk assumed by the Federal 
Reserve.) If even further safeguards are needed, and it is not obvious 
that they are, the payments mechanism could be transformed into a 
separately capitalized “exchange” that would absorb counterparty risks 
and  establish  rules  for  access  and  procedures  for  collateralizing 
transactions. 
Deposit Insurance Reform 
We  must restore market discipline and reduce the ambiguity about 
which depositors are insured and under what circumstances. We  offer 
the following program: 
1. Regulators, stockholders, management, creditors, and depositors 
should know exactly what the rules are in advance. Ambiguity creates 
anxiety in the markets, undermining confidence in the banking system 
and increasing the potential for panic. 
2.  Only small depositors ($100,000 and under) should be insured. 
Everyone else should be at risk. 
3. Insurance premiums should not be assessed on uninsured deposits, 
domestic or foreign. 
4. Greater market discipline-the  prospect of paying more for funds 
or not being able to raise enough funds at any price-is  a powerful 
incentive for management to keep its house in order. 
5. Effective market discipline depends upon disclosure of credible 
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6. If regulators intervene before a troubled bank has exhausted its 
capital cushion, the potential losses to insurance funds and the public 
are much smaller. 
7.  Mark-to-market  accounting will inform both regulators and the 
market of the real value of a bank’s assets so that their actions are 
informed and timely. 
8. Risk-based capital requirements, if  enforced, make it much less 
likely that a bank will ever approach insolvency. 
9. An absolute requirement for the stability of our fractional reserve 
banking system is that the Federal Reserve must stand ready to act as 
the lender of last resort and to supply liquidity to solvent but tempo- 
rarily illiquid banks. 
10. Once it is determined that a bank is approaching insolvency, it 
must be allowed to fail. It does not follow that the bank is abruptly 
shut down. There can be an orderly process for reorganizing or liq- 
uidating a failed bank just as there is an orderly chapter 11 process for 
commercial firms. 
It should be possible to construct a safety net for the system (but 
not for banks) without raising questions of subsidy or unfair advantage. 
If deposits are insured, fair premiums are paid and the fund is protected 
by risk-based capital and adequate collateral. There is no assumption 
that only banks (or thrifts) are entitled to insurance. If there are discount 
window borrowings,  they  are secured and at  a fair market  rate  of 
interest. There is no assumption that only banks (or thrifts) are eligible 
to borrow. 
Any  other significant services provided  by  the government or the 
insurance funds are charged to their users at a fair price.  Access to 
these services could be provided to any bank or nonbank if appropriate 
for system safety. Most important, the full consequences of risk taking 
fall on the risk takers and not on the public. 
Functional Regulation 
A direct route to competitive equity among suppliers of  financial 
services is regulation according to function, rather than to types of 
institutions. This approach is especially important in view of the real- 
ities of the marketplace for financial attributes. The traditionally defined 
boundaries between different sorts of institutions and financial instru- 
ments are being obscured, even eliminated, as all institutions offer 
functional equivalents of one another’s products. 
Take, for instance, the case of transaction accounts. At one time, 
these were the exclusive preserve  of banks.  Eventually, investment 
banks established money funds that, because they were not in com- 
mercial banks, were free of reserve requirements, rate ceilings, and so 
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banks to create money market accounts, although banks still face nu- 
merous competitive disadvantages. 
Functional regulation not only promotes competitive equity because 
it deals with the world as it really is. Functional regulation also involves 
the most efficient use of regulatory resources, since it requires only 
primary regulatory for one generic activity or product. 
Removal of Arbitrary Restrictions on Product Powers 
The pressures created by  advancing information technology-new 
products and new competitors-make  it apparent that any system of 
regulation that is wedded to antique forms is dangerously obsolete. Yet 
that is exactly what we have: a major pillar of the regulatory framework, 
the Glass-Steagall Act, is based on the increasingly meaningless dis- 
tinction between loans and securities. 
Defenders of Glass-Steagall contend that allowing banks to under- 
write domestic corporate securities would endanger the “safety  and 
soundness” of the banking system. While there is no doubt that a stable, 
healthy system of banking and capital markets is vital to the nation’s 
economy, there is considerable doubt that Glass-Steagall somehow pro- 
tects the stability and health of banks. In fact, the notion that Glass- 
Steagall somehow protects banks is the truth stood on its head: Glass- 
Steagall threatens the “safety and soundness” of the financial system 
by limiting banks’ ability to compete on an equal footing and to manage 
their business prudently. 
Underwriting and Risk 
The myth that bank underwriting activities caused the Great Depres- 
sion has been debunked by careful economic analysis and examination 
of the historical record. There is no evidence that underwriting losses 
have caused any significant bank or securities firm to fail. 
It is not difficult to see why the risks of  securities underwriting are 
low and manageable. Underwriters hold securities for only a brief pe- 
riod-days or weeks at most. It is not unusual for an issue to be presold 
before it comes to market. Any  securities that must be held by  the 
underwriter can be substantially hedged against price changes by using 
options, futures, or short positions. The underwriting spread provides 
a further buffer against  losses. A study by  Ian Giddy of  Columbia 
University  showed that domestic equity underwritings between  1976 
and 1983 rarely lost money for the syndicate involved and that those 
losses seldom exceeded $500,00&hardly  a scary business. 
The robust profits of the major securities firms are testimony to the 
relatively  low  risk  (not to mention  excessive  concentration)  of  the 
domestic securities business. From 1979 to 1983, the after-tax rate of 
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percent, compared to less than 15 percent for the ten largest commercial 
banks. 
Now consider lenders who originate and hold loans to maturity. Most 
of these are unmarketable medium- and long-term loans to borrowers 
who do not have good enough credit ratings to go to the open markets. 
Lenders also provide backup commitments to those borrowers who 
currently have access to the open markets but who will come to the 
banks if  they are shut out of those markets because of deteriorating 
credit standing. 
Can there be any doubt that securities underwriting is less risky than 
traditional lending? Skeptics should examine the case of Continental 
Illinois and Seattle First, whose risky and poorly diversified loan port- 
folios caused the bank to collapse. It is no accident that many banks 
are trying to liquify their loan portfolios to capture the value of loan 
origination  and distribution  skills without taking such large portfolio 
risks. This attempt to  liquify loans will erase the few remaining financial 
distinctions  between loans and securities-leaving  only the artificial 
and archaic legal and emotional distinctions. 
Divers$cation,  Productivity, and Underwriting 
If  the arbitrary legal distinctions between loans and securities and 
between lenders and underwriters were eliminated, a bank could prop- 
erly position itself within the generalized business of originating, dis- 
tributing, trading, and investing in financial attributes, without regard 
to the form of the investment. The ability  to compete freely in  this 
wider arena would not only give banks a fair chance to regain some of 
the market share that has been lost to nonbank competitors; it would 
also dramatically expand banks’ ability to diversify their portfolio risks, 
increase the liquidity of their balance sheets, and make more productive 
use of their capital and people. These benefits are potentially enormous 
and could dramatically increase the “safety and soundness” of banks 
both large and small. 
Concentration of Power 
Opponents of  bank underwriting have waved the flag of bank dom- 
ination.  It is a curious concern in  this  day and age: the danger of 
concentrated market power of U.S. commercial banks seems remote, 
even absurd, in a time of global financial markets and the ascendancy 
of securitization over bank lending. Nevertheless, any excessive mar- 
ket power could and should be addressed by the antitrust laws. The 
real danger is the concentrated market power and inflated profits  of 
domestic investment banks. The obvious cure for this malady is the 
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Implementation 
Once we agree that banks need new powers, an interesting procedural 
question arises. Should these new powers be exercised in the bank 
itself or in a separately incorporated and capitalized subsidiary of the 
parent holding company? 
It is difficult to see the point in granting banks expanded powers and 
then compromising their ability to employ them efficiently and effec- 
tively. Insisting that banks use their new powers through separately 
incorporated and capitalized subsidiaries  is precisely such a compromise. 
The separate subsidiary approach is inefficient as well as unneces- 
sary. Again, competing in the new global markets will require a high 
degree of organizational flexibility, informal and temporary networks, 
coordination, and cooperation. Walls erected to provide an unnecessary 
insulation can only make it more difficult to achieve excellent com- 
petitive performance. 
If it is a question of the deposit insurance fund inappropriately sub- 
sidizing securities activities, the answer is that the safety net should 
not subsidize or bail out any institution, bank or nonbank, big or small. 
Risk-based capital, fair insurance premiums, and market discipline- 
the abandonment of the “too big to fail”  doctrine-and  the prudent 
use of the lender-of last-resort powers of the Federal Reserve eliminate 
any  question of  subsidy  without  resorting  to separate subsidiaries. 
Another approach would be for the banks to collateralize deposits under 
$100,000, thus obviating the need for the insurance fund entirely. 
If  it is a question of conflicts of interest, self-interest in preserving 
a good reputation and the penalties  of the securities acts should be 
sufficient, It would be  a shame to reach the sound conclusion  that 
banks  need  new powers, only to dissipate some of  the benefits by 
requiring an inefficient and unnecessary  device for exercising those 
powers. 
Proponents of the separate subsidiary approach usually cite a need 
for insulating the bank from the supposed dangers of the new activities. 
The argument  is that  this  insulation  is easier to accomplish  and to 
monitor if new activities are in a separate legal entity. 
It should be clear from everything that has gone before that insulation 
from the securities business is the last thing a bank  needs. It is the 
bunking activities that are dangerous, not the securities activities. Se- 
curities activities will strengthen the bank, not weaken it. Indeed, it is 
easy enough to imagine the employees of a securities firm wishing to 
be insulated from the bunk. 
The world of  finance is changing irreversibly. In time, we suspect 
that public authorities will achieve consensus on five basic principles 
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First, financial services firms must function as single, integrated in- 
stitutions. These institutions will be confined to finance, however, and 
will not engage in commerce. 
Second, regulators throughout the world will have to reach a meeting 
of the minds. Since the financial marketplace will be global, regulation 
will have to be consistent worldwide. 
Third, financial institutions in  this country will have to be able to 
compete equally in all markets, all exercising the same product powers. 
Fourth, these institutions will have to be organized flexibly in order 
to respond to rapid change; institutions that are too large or too varied 
will have difficulty adapting to change. 
Fifth, and finally, these jurisdictions  will  be  accepted:  the public 
responsibility is for the health of the financial system in general, and 
the system only; the private responsibility is for the health of individual 
institutions. 
At this point, we shall truly have achieved safety and soundness in 
our financial system. 
Summary of Discussion 
The first theme of  the discussion was the implications of financial in- 
novation  for macroeconomic  policy.  Geoffrey  Carliner wondered  if 
financial deregulation contributed to the unexpected decline in velocity 
during 1982, which in turn contributed to an unexpected change in the 
effect of Fed policy and to the depth of the 1982 recession. A 2 percent 
of  GNP loss due to lack of  Fed control associated with financial in- 
novation would wipe out a lot of efficiency gain, he pointed out. Gerald 
Corrigan proposed that technical/measurement problems were not an 
overriding problem in the  1982 recession, and the ambiguity that did 
exist revolved around money market mutual funds prior to the avail- 
ability of bank money markets. In any case, he noted, there is no choice 
involved in financial innovation, which is a technically driven process. 
A question that is intellectually fascinating and policy relevant, ac- 
cording to Corrigan, is the issue of an inherent contradiction between 
the speed of capital and exchange rate movements and a monetary 
policy process compatible with a far more stable exchange rate envi- 
ronment. Another recent development is the disappearance of a stable 
private debt to GNP ratio since 1982. While some academics say not 
to worry, Corrigan does. Certainly innovation alters this relationship, 
and the question is how monetary restraint will work through a system 
with such a high degree of intermediation. Martin Feldstein pointed 
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which in turn implies great interest sensitivity. Corrigan contended that 
the behavior of highly leveraged instruments is unknown and that the 
cumulative effect of  financial innovation and leverage may be that a 
given degree of  money restraint will require higher levels of interest 
rates. 
Attention shifted to German and Japanese monetary aggregates when 
Jeffrey Frankel remarked that the Germans and Japanese resist Amer- 
ican calls for more expansionary monetary policy by referring to high 
M1 growth in their countries. He wondered if the monetary authorities 
in these countries do not know about the breakdown in the M1-to-GNP 
relationship. Corrigan responded that little has changed in the monetary 
aggregates in these countries, except for a relatively minor change in 
the interest rate on Japanese postal savings accounts. He added that 
the situation in the United States is related not just to financial inno- 
vation but to the large drop in nominal interest rates over time. 
Rudiger Dornbusch returned to the question of the benefits of finan- 
cial innovation. He raised the possibility of an overproduction of va- 
rieties and pointed out that in manufacturing investment it would be 
preferable if  financial analysis was done over horizons of longer than 
one quarter, suggesting that decisions become completely short term 
when financial instruments can be split up into attributes with little 
apparent connection to the real investment.  Corrigan agreed that  a 
series of questions existed about the costs of financial innovation, but 
he  argued  that  the  existence  of  an  enormous  flow  of  benefits  is 
indisputable. 